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Abstract
The Argentine  crisis has been variously blamed on fiscal  areas,  neither of them was higher than those affecting
imbalances,  real overvaluation,  and self-fulfilling investor  other countries in the region,  and thus there is not one
pessimism triggering a capital flow reversal.  Perry and  obvious suspect.  But the three reinforced each  other in
Serv6n provide an encompassing  assessment of the role  such a perverse way that taken jointly they led to a much
of these and other ingredients  in the recent  larger vulnerability to adverse external shocks than in
macroeconomic  collapse. They show that in the final  any other country in the region. Underlying these
years of convertibility, Argentina was not hit harder than  vulnerabilities was a deep structural  problem of the
other emerging markets in Latin America and elsewhere  Argentine economy that led to harsh policy dilemmas
by global terms-of-trade  and financial  disturbances.  So  before and after the crisis erupted.  On the one hand, the
the crisis reflects primarily the high vulnerability to  Argentine trade structure made a peg to the dollar highly
disturbances  built into Argentina's policy framework.  inconvenient from the point of view of the real economy.
Three key sources of vulnerability  are  examined:  the  On the other hand, the strong preference of Argentinians
hard peg adopted against optimal  currency area  for the dollar as a store of value-after  the hyperinflation
considerations  in a context of wage and price  and confiscation  experiences  of the 1980s-had  led to a
inflexibility;  the fragile  fiscal position resulting from an  highly dollarized  economy in which a hard peg or even
expansionary  stance  in the boom; and the pervasive  full dollarization seemed reasonable alternatives  from a
mismatches  in the portfolios  of banks' borrowers. While  financial point of view.
there were important vulnerabilities  in each of these
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The  severity  of the  Argentine  crisis  and  its  dire  social  cost  have  come  as  a
surprise to  most observers,  even  to those that  had been predicting  it since the Brazilian
devaluation  of  1999.  There  were  very  few  that Iredicted  it before  1999.  Indeed,  the
Argentine  economy  appeared  to  be  in  relatively  good  shape  at  least  until  before  the
Russian  crisis.  Even then  the  attention  of the  markets  and  the  International  Financial
Institutions was  focused on Brazil, which had more apparent  macroeconomic  imbalances
and had suffered  severe  speculative  attacks  in October  1997 and again after the Russian
crisis,  leading  to the  demise of the  exchange  rate band and  a  sharp  devaluation  of the
Real in January  1999.
Argentina outperformed most other economies in the region until  1997 in terms of
growth per  capita  --  though  income  distribution  did  not  improve  and  unemployment
stayed at high levels --  in a relatively benign external  environment (terms of trade, capital
inflows and spreads, worlcl growth),  in spite of a short-lived  interruption in  1995 when  it
suffered  severe  contagion  from  the  Tequila  crisis.  But  after  the  major  slowdown  in
growth in  1999 that affected the whole  region, mainly  due to capital flow retrenchment
after  the  Russian  crisis,  other  countries  in  the  region  began a  modest  recovery,  while
Argentina plunged into a protracted recession,  reversing  most of her previous  gains at
poverty  reduction  We  explore  in  Section  II  if this  difference  in performance  can  be
attributed to Argentina receiving more severe external  shocks than other economies in the
region. We find that Argerntina  was not hit harder than other Latin American countries by
the terms of trade decline after the Asian crisis, nor by the US and worldwide  slowdown
in 2001,  nor by the capital  flows reversal and the rise in spreads after the Russian  crisis.
As a consequence,  the fact: that Argentina did worse than other countries after  1999 must
be  attributed  to  her  higher  vulnerabilities  to  shocks,  weaker  policy  responses  or  a
combination of both.  Indeed,  we find in  Section II  that  the large  capital  flow reversal in
2001 was driven by  Argentina-specific  factors.  We  view this  as evidence  that "sudden
stops" of capital flows acted more as an amplifier than as a primary cause of the crisis. 1
Thus, the bulk of this paper is devoted to examine to which extent and why was
the  Argentine  economy  more  vulnerable  to  adverse  external  shocks  than  other  Latin
American economies, and to what extent were policy mistakes (particularly during the De
la  Rua  Government)  the  main  culprit,  as  has  been  often  claimed.2 We  examine  the
vulnerabilities  associated  with  deflationary  adjustments  to  shocks  under  a hard  peg  in
Section  III;  those  associated  with  a  large  public  debt  and  a  fragile  fiscal position in
Section IV and those  hidden under a facade of strength in the banking  sector in Section
V. We conclude that although there  were important vulnerabilities  in each of these areas,
neither of them  on its  oWnI  was  larger  than those  affecting  some  other countries  in the
region,  and  thus  there  is  no  one obvious  suspect.  However,  we  also  find  that  they
1 This view is  in contrast with the interpretation put forward in Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002), though
in most other aspects our conclusions agree with those in that paper.
2 There is by now an extensive literature analyzing the causes of the Argentina crisis. See for example the
papers by Hausmann and Velasco  (2002), Mussa (2002), Powell (2002) and Teijeiro (2001)
1reinforced each other in such a perverse way that taken jointly they led to a much larger
vulnerability  to adverse external shocks than in any other country in the region
In  particular,  the  hard  peg  and  inflexible  domestic  nominal  wages  and  prices
imposed a protracted  deflationary adjustment in response to the  depreciation  of the Euro
and the real, the terms of trade  shocks  and the capital market shock of 1998,  leading to a
major overvaluation of the currency and a rapidly deteriorating net foreign asset position.
Such  imbalances  were  aggravated  by weak  fiscal  policies during  the  decade,  especially
after 1995.  In Section III we estimate that all these factors led since  1997 to an increasing
overvaluation of the currency that peaked in 2001  at over 50 percent.  The need to address
the rising concern with solvency  - given the large  debt, the weak primary fiscal balance
and low growth  - led to  tax hikes and budget  cuts  in 2000  and 2001  that deepened  the
economic  contraction.  The endogenous  capital flow reversal  and increased risk premium
in  2001  amplified  these  problems  by  requiring  a  large  external  current  account
adjustment.  To  aggravate  matters,  such an adjustment  under the  hard  peg  had  to  take
place mostly through  demand reduction and aggregate  deflation  - a lengthy, costly  and
uncertain process.
The  hard  peg  actually  hid  from  public  view  the  serious  deterioration  in fiscal
solvency and the mounting financial stress. Indeed, the protracted deflationary adjustment
required  to realign the real  exchange  rate  under the  hard peg  would have  unavoidably
eroded  the  debt  repayment  capacity  of the  Government,  households  and  finns  in  non
tradable  sectors  - the  debtors  whose  incomes  would  be  more  adversely  affected  as  a
direct result of the deflation. 3 The collapse of the peg in 2002  revealed  in full force these
latent problems and made them much worse due to the exchange  rate overshooting and
the  disruption  of ihe payments  system  derived  from  the  deposit  freeze  (the  so  called
"corralito")  --  which  might  have  been  partially  avoided  by  better  policy  responses.
Financial  stress  was  amplified  by the  large  exposure  of banks  and Pension  Funds  to
increasing  Government  risk.  Thus  a  vicious  circle  of  economic  contraction,  fiscal
hardship and financial stress ensued.
The  authorities  and  the  Argentine  polity  were  indeed  faced  with  very  harsh
dilemmas after  1998  (as discussed in Section VI).  They were placed between  a rock  and
a hard place.  One option was to accept a painful and protracted deflationary  adjustment
while  keeping the  Currency  Board  - and  attempting  to retain  market  confidence  in  the
meantime.  This  would have  entailed  a severe test  of the  fragile  Argentine  political  and
fiscal institutions.
An early adoption  of full  dollarization  might  have  reduced  somewhat  the  pains
and duration of the deflationary  adjustment,  and thus  increased the likelihood of success
of such an option.  But it would have left the Argentine  economy exposed to a repetition
of these problems in the future.
3 While some debtors from the tradable sector might be affected by an economy -wide deflation as well, the
increase in the real value of the debt relative to real income due to the recession and price deflation would
have impacted most strongly on the nontradable sector.  On this see also the discussion in Roubini (2001).
2The  other  option  was  to  allow  a  nominal  devaluation  and  adopt  a  float,  in  an
attempt  to  shortcut  the  protracted  deflationary  adjustment.  However,  this  would  have
precipitated  a  latent  colporate,  banking  and  fiscal  crisis,  given  the  open  currency
exposures  in the  balance  sheets  of both  the public  and the  private  sectors  and the  large
degree  of overvaluation  of the  currency.  In  order  to  avoid  such  scenario,  financial
contracts  would have  to  be pesified before  floating.  But this in  turn posed the  serious
danger of a deposit run, which would have forced a deposit freeze  and/or some kind of
Bonex plan, fatally eroding the public's confidence in money as a store of value.
In the event, the authorities  did not use well their limited margin of maneuver,  by
engaging  in  too  little  and  too  late  fiscal  adjustment  (which  actually  should have  been
done in the  boom years before  1999),  by hesitating  on the  ultimate  choice  of exchange
rate  regime,  by  postponing  too  long  the  needed  public  debt  restructuring,  and  by
precipitating a major financial and payments crisis - first reducing the liquidity buffers of
the banking  system and over-exposing  it (along  with the Pension Funds)  to Government
risk, and later adopting an arbitrary asymmetric  pesification of assets and liabilities and a
particularly  disruptive  deposit  freeze,  which  was held for an excessively  long period  of
time  without  resolution  Such  actions  and  omissions  deepened  the  crisis  and  created
additional unnecessary problems for the recovery.
These hard  choices  were  a  reflection of a  deep  structural  problem.  On the one
hand, the  Argentine trade structure  made a peg to the  dollar highly  inadequate  --  from a
real economy point of view.  On the other hand, the strong preference of Argentineans  for
the dollar as a store of value (since the hyperinflation and confiscation experiences  of the
1980s)  had  led  to  a  higly  dollarized  economy  in  which  a  hard  peg  or  even  full
dollarization seemed  a reasonable  alternative  from a financial  point of view, not only to
avoid massive  capital  gains  and losses  resulting from exchange  rate changes, but also as
an expeditious  shortcut  to  nominal  stability  and  monetary  credibility.  No  wonder that
inforned analysts favored -and still do-  opposite exchange  regime  choices depending on
the relative weight they assign to real economy or financial considerations.
With the benefit of hindsight,  the  boom years up to mid 1998  were a major lost
opportunity.  Staying with the hard peg but ninimizing the risks  associated with adverse
external  shocks  would  have  required  four  supporting  ingredients:  First and  foremost,
significant fiscal strengthening, not just to protect solvency but with the broader objective
of  providing  some  room  for  counter-cyclical  fiscal  policy.  This  contrasts  with  the
expansionary  pro-cyclical  stance  actually  followed  during  most  of  the  decade,  and
especially  during  the  boom  from  end-1995  up  to mid-1998  - once  the implicit pension
debt (as well as other implicit liabilities) had been brought in the open by pension reform
(as documented  in  Section  IV).  Second,  considerable  flexibilization  of  labor and  other
domestic markets  (including utilities).  Third, significant unilateral opening to trade. None
of this was done in the nineties. And fourth, even stricter prudential regulations  for banks
than actually adopted (in spite of the significant progress achieved in this field), including
harder provisioning and/or  capital requirements  for loans to households  and finns in non
tradable  sectors,  a  "firewall"  between  banks  and  the  Government  and  some  form  of
3earmarking of liquidity to demand deposits in order to protect the payments system in the
event of a systemic deposit run (as discussed in Section V).
Alternatively,  those  years would have  been  the right time to  engage in a more
orderly change  of the  exchange  rate regime.  But the  exit, whether  towards a successful
flexible exchange rate regime with a monetary anchor or to full dollarization, would have
also  required  significant  structural  reforms  and institution  building.  Instead,  this was  a
period of inaction and laxity on many fronts.
Just too  often in  Latin America  the  seeds of crisis  are planted in good times  by
imprudent  behavior  or  lack  of precautionary  action,  whose  consequences  are  only
revealed when  bad times  arrive.  There are  deep political  economy  factors  that help to
explain such  bad outcomes.  A key  lesson from Argentina  is the  need to adopt economic
and political  institutions  that  align  incentives  to  face  hard choices  and  facilitate timely
reforms, and in particular  that are less prone to amplifying economic  cycles.
The  analysis  of the  Argentine  crisis  yields many  other useful  lessons  for  other
Latin  American  economies.  After  all,  the  exchange  rate  system  dilemma  faced by  a
highly  dollarized  economy  that conducts  only  a  fraction  of its trade  with the  US,  in  a
world economy characterized  by highly volatile currencies,  is not exclusive to Argentina.
But  even  economies  with  less  stringent  structural  dilemmas  often  face  some  form of
tension between  the  convenience  of adopting  and  maintaining  a  flexible  exchange  rate
regime  with  a monetary  anchor  in  order to  achieve  flexibility  in responding  to  shocks,
and balance  sheet  vulnerabilities  to  major  real  exchange  rate adjustments  originated  in
unhedged  foreign-currency  debt  of firms  in non-tradable  sectors  and of Governments
themselves.4 Even  those could  draw  useful  policy lessons from the  Argentine  debacle.
And so can we, in the International  Financial Institutions, as we must admit that we were
slow in understanding some of the deep problems  discussed here and in reacting to them.
II.  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE  AND EXTERNAL  SHOCKS IN THE 1990s:
The endogeneity  of capital flow  reversals
Over  1990-97,  Argentina  outperformed  most  other  economies  in  the  region  in
terms of growth (Table  2.1).  The  external  environment  (terms of trade,  capital  inflows,
sovereign  spreads  and world  growth)  was relatively  benign in  those years,  apart  from  a
short-lived  but  abrupt  interruption  in  1995  due  to  the  Tequila  crisis,  from  which
Argentina  suffered  a  severe  contagion.  The  growth  performance  remained  fairly
satisfactory even in 1998. But after the region-wide growth slowdown of 1999 - largely a
consequence  of capital  flow  retrenchment  following  the  Russian  crisis  - other  Latin
American countries  began a modest recovery, while Argentina plunged into a protracted
recession.
4 What Calvo and Reinhart  (2000) have described as "liability dollarization" that leads to "fear of floating"
and Hausmann et al. (2000) have attributed to the inability to issue long term debt in local currency.
4Table 2.1. Real GDP Growth Rate
(Percent per year)
1981-90  1991-97  1998  1999  2000-01
Argentina  -1.3  6.7  3.9  -3.4  -2.6
Bolivia  -0.4  4.3  5.0  0.4  1.8
Brazil  2.3  3.1  0.1  0.8  3.0
Chile  4.0  8.3  3.9  -1.1  3.6
Colombia  3.4  4.0  0.6  -4.1  2.0
Costa Rica  2.4  4.8  8.4  8.2  1.6
Ecuador  :2.1  3.2  0.4  -7.3  4.0
Mexico  1.5  2.9  5.0  3.6  3.2
Peru  0.0  5.3  -0.5  0.9  1.7
Venezuela  0.3  3.4  0.2  -6.1  3.0
Average  1.4  4.6  2.7  -0.8  2.1
Source: World Development  Indicators Database and the Unified Survey.
Figure 2.1. Poverty, Inequality, and Unemployment
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Unemployment  kept  a slightly  increasing  trend  up to  the Tequila  crisis, when it
jumped  sharply  (Figure  2.1).  The  fact  that  unemployment  was  rising  even  when  the
economy was  growing  at  full  steam  reflects  a combination  of rising  participation  rates
5(likely  stemming  from an  'encouragement  effect'  due to the  growth upturn),  declining
labor-intensity  of production  techniques  (encouraged  by  the  real  appreciation  of the
peso),  productive  restructuring  towards  less labor-intensive  activities, and probably also
the  poor operation  of the  labor market.5 The unemployment  rate  declined  in the boom
years  1996-1998,  to resume an upward trend during the ensuing recession.
Poverty  indicators  display  a  similar  trajectory  (Figure  2.1).  Poverty  declined
sharply  until  1994,  but  rose  again  with  the  Tequila  crisis  and  then  continued  on  an
upward  trend  during  the  recession  of 1999-2001,  so that by 2001  the gains  at poverty
reduction achieved in the early part of the decade had been wiped out. Even more striking
is the trajectory of inequality,  which appears to have risen without interruption from 1993
on, after an initial decline in 1990-92.
Was  Argentina's  poor  growth  performance  from  1999  onward  a  reflection  of
more adverse  external  shocks  than  those affecting  other Latin American  and Caribbean
(henc,eforth  LAC)  countries?  To  answer  this  question,  we  first  consider  real  shocks
stemming  from terms  of trade  changes  and global  growth  and then  look at capital  flow
disturbances.
We  begin  by  looking  at  terms  of trade  changes.  Argentina's  terms  of trade
declined  by  over  10  percent  in  1998/99,  but  recovered  fairly  quickly  in  2000/01.
Moreover,  the  temporary  drop followed a rise that had occurred  in 1996/97.  Relative to
other  countries,  Argentina's terms  of trade  decline  in  1998/99  was  less severe  than that
suffered  at  first  by  oil  exporting  countries  like  Venezuela  and  Ecuador,  which  as  a
consequence  suffered  a  much  deeper  contraction  in  1999  (Figure  2.2a).  Likewise,  the
cumulative  terms  of trade  decline  from  1997  through  2001  was  less  pronounced  for
Argentina than for Chile, and much less than the one experienced by Peru.
In  any  case,  the  economic  impact  of these  gyrations  in  the  terms  of trade  was
much less significant  for Argentina than for other countries.  The reason is that Argentina
is a fairly closed economy, and thus terms of trade changes entail only modest changes in
real income.  This is highlighted in Figure 2.2b, which portrays the terms of trade shocks
suffered by various  LAC  economies,  calculated  multiplying  the changes  in import and
export prices by the respective  magnitudes of imports  and exports relative to GDP.  It is
immediately  apparent that Argentina's  terms of trade shocks over the second half of the
1990s were  smaller in magnitude  than those of any other country in the graphs, perhaps
with the only exception of Brazil (which is also fairly closed).  Indeed, Argentina's real
income  loss from the terms of trade fall in  1998-99  amounted to less than 0.5 percent of
GDP.
5  See Galiani (2001)  for a recent assessment of the state of Argentina's labor market.
6Figure 2.2 a. Terms of Trade
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Source: World  Development Indicators - World Bank.The  other  source  of adverse  real  shocks  was  the  global  growth  slowdown  that
started in 2000.  Relative  to that year,  in 2001  real  GDP growth declined by 3 percentage
points both  in the U.S.  and the  industrialized  world as  a whole.  Like with the  terms of
trade  decline,  however,  Argentina  was  much  less  affected  than  other  countries  in the
region,  again  because  of  its  lower  degree  of  openness.  As  a  result,  the  growth
deceleration and  the ensuing slowdown in export markets translated into a fairly modest
aggregate  demand  decline  for Argentina  - the  smallest  among  the  countries  shown  in
Table 2.2.6
Table 2.2.  Impact of the Global Slowdown  2001:
The Inicome Effect via Trade Volume
Exports / GDP  Exports of  Exports of  Impact of the  Impact of the
(%)  goods to  goods to  decline in U.S.  decline in
US/Total  OECD/Total  growth (%  of  OECD growth
Exoorts 1%)  ExDorts (%)  GDP)  (%  of GDP)
(a)  (b)  (c)  21(c)[(ar(b)*  (d)-[(a)*(c)*
(a)  (b)  (c)  ~~~~~~~2.21*0.03  2.21*0.03
Argentina  10.81  10.90  33.09  -0.08  -0.24
Bolivia  17.55  13.86  25.27  -0.16  -0.29
Brazil  10.81  24.70  57.11  -0.18  -0.41
Chile  31.85  18.48  62.44  -0.39  -1.31
Colombia  21.34  43.45  60.22  -0.61  -0.85
Costa Rica  48.09  41.38  72.01  -1.31  -2.29
Dominican Rep.  29.93  86.47  94.37  -1.71  -1.86
Ecuador  42.43  38.55  67.05  -1.08  -1.88
Guatemala  19.93  56.40  70.80  -0.74  -0.93
Jamaica  42.94  30.86  85.80  -0.87  -2.43
Mexico  31.06  88.55  94.31  -1.82  -1.93
Peru  15.98  25.39  63.55  -0.27  -0.67
Venezuela, RB  28.45  53.81  64.14  -1.01  -1.20
Notes:
(a)Exports of Goods and Services and GDP of 2000, source: WDI.
(b) Exports of goods in 2001 source:lM F Direction  of Trade.
(c)  2.2 is  the U.S.  expenditure elasticity (Clanda,1994), and 3%  is  the decline in  the  U.S. economic growth  between 2000 and 2001(d) 3 %
Is  the decline in the OECD economic growth between  2000 and 2001.
Next,  we  turn  to  the  disturbances  stemming  from  world  financial  markets.7
Following the Russian  crisis, Latin American countries  - like other emerging  economies
- had to  face a generalized  increase  in the  cost of market borrowing.  Figure  2.3, which
offers a  comparative  perspective  on the  sovereign  spreads  faced  by different  countries,
shows that Argentina  did not  fare  worse  than the rest of the  region  in this regard.  As a
matter  of  fact,  Brazil's  spreads  rose  above  Argentina's  in  1997-99,  with speculative
attacks  on the  real  taking place  in October  1997  and October  1998.  It was only in late
2000  that the  Argentine  spread began  to drift  above  Brazil's.  And the same happened
with Venezuela  and  Ecuador,  whose  spreads  (not shown  to  avoid cluttering  the  graph)
increased more than Argentina's in  1998 and remained higher until 2001.
6 The impact on export demand shown in the table is calculated using an income elasticity of 2.2 for both
U.S. and OECD imports.
7  The role of external financial shocks in the Argentine crisis has been underscored  in particular by Calvo,
Izquierdo and Talvi (2002).
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0  (4~~~~  e  a  a  a a  a  a~~~~t  a  Inn  a  n  a  so  aThe  comparative  evolution  of  the  current  and  capital  accounts  across  LAC
countries  tells the  same  story.  Until  late  2000,  Argentina's  capital  account  surplus (as
percentage  of GDP)  rerrmained  above  the  regional  average  (Figure  2.5a).  Its  current
account  deficit likewise  exceeded  the  region's  norm  (Figure  2.5b).  Indeed,  the current
account  adjustment  that  Argentina,  like  most  Latin  American  countries,  undertook  in
1999  - a result  of the capital  flow decline that followed the  Russian crisis  - was  fairly
modest by regional  standards.  Among the larger countries,  it exceed only Mexico's, and
was dwarfed by the current account correction undertaken by Chile, Colombia and Peru -
not to mention the dramatic adjustments of oil-exporting  Ecuador and Venezuela  (Table
2.3).
Figure 2.5 a Capital Account
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In summary,  while  the  global  contraction  in capital  flows  that occurred  in  1999
reached  virtually all Latin  American  economies,  Argentina  was not affected as  severely
as  (and certainly not more severely than)  other countries  in the region.  Thus,  Argentina
was able  at first to continue  running large  current  account deficits,  as it had done  in the
previous  years.  After  199>9,  however,  capital  flows  to  most  LAG  countries  recovered
somewhat,  except  for  Airgentina  (and  Venezuela),  where  they  continued  to  fall,
especially  sharply  in  2001.  Thus,  the  tentative  conclusion  is that  the  deterioration  of
capital  flows  to  Argentina  at the  end  of the  decade  reflected  mostly Argentina-specific
factors  rather1than2global  factors.Figure 2.5 b. Current Account
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Source: Balance of Payments  from domestic sources via HAVER.  Latin America
average includes Arg,  Bra,  Chi, Col, Mex, and  Pe.
Table 2.3.  Current Account Adjustment
as share of GDP  as share of Imports
1998/99  2000/01  1998/99  2000/01
Argentina  0.77  1.29  7.16  14.51
Bolivia  1.44  1.54  4.96  7.83
Brazil  1.11  -0.55  13.83  -7.33
Chile  5.56  -0.86  22.38  -3.64
Colombia  5.20  -3.14  34.37  -22.55
Costa Rica  -0.91  -0.34  -2.07  -0.83
Ecuador  15.84  -12.20  56.03  -41.16
Mexico  0.37  0.31  1.13  0.92
Peru  3.19  0.50  20.75  3.37
Venezuela,  RB  7.24  -5.56  42.99  -41.67
Average  3.98  -1.90  20.15  -9.06
Note:
Current Account adjustment  is defined as the year on year difference in the
Current Account surplus as share of GDP or imports.
Sources:  Imports (US$) from  Direction of Trade (IMF);  GDP and Current
Account Balance (US$)  from WDI (World  Bank).
12We  can  assess  more  formally  the  relative  role  of global  and  countryspecific
factors in the observed pattern of capital  flows to Argentina  and other countries using a
suitable  statistical  decomposition  separating  the  common  component  of  sovereign
spreads  from  their  country-specific  component.  Loosely  speaking,  the  common
component  reflects  global  conditions  (both interdependence  and 'contagion'),  and hence
captures  global  risk,  while  the  country-specific  component  reflects  each  country's
economic  fundamentals  (or, more precisely,  investors'  perceptions  about them)  and thus
provides a measure of its pure risk premium. 8
This  procedure  yields  a  synthetic  "global  factor",  whose  role  in  the  observed
evolution  of  emerging-market  spreads  is depicted  in the top  panel of Figure  2.6.  The
figure plots the degree of comovement of the spreads, as measured by the fraction of their
total  variation  (computed  over  moving  48-month  windows)  attributable  to  the  global
factor.  The  graph  shows  that  the  global  factor  accounts  for  the  vast  majority  of the
variation in  spreads up to  1998.  After that date, there  is a steady decline in the degree of
co-movement  of spreads., reversed only in part in September 2001.
The  bottom panel  of Figure  2.6 performs the  same exercise  for Argentina,  Brazil
and  Mexico.  For  each  of these  countries,  the  figure  shows  the  fraction  of  the  total
variation in its spread attributable to the global factor just described.  In all three countries
analyzed,  sovereign  spreads  reflect  both  global and  country-specific  risk.  The  roles of
these  two  factors  are  riot  the  same  across  countries  and  time  periods,  however.  In
accordance  with  the previous  figure,  the  global  factor plays the  main role  up to  1998.
Indeed,  in  1997-98  it  accounts  for  the  bulk  of the  variation  in  spreads  in  all  three
countries.  After the  Russia crisis in  1998,  however,  the contribution of the global  factor
declines  for  the  three  countries.  Importantly,  the  extent  of the  decline  differs  aross
countries.  In the case of Argentina,  it is much more marked and accelerates  noticeably in
the  second  half of 2000.  In  fact,  after that  moment  global  factors  account for  less than
half  of  the  observed  variation  in  Argentina's  spreads.  The  conclusion  is that  such
variation increasingly reflects  country-specific  factors after 1998,  and especially  so from
2000 onward.
8The full details are spelled ouat in Fiess (2002).  In a nutshell, we use principal component analysis to
construct an indicator of global comovement of  spreads using end-of-the-month  JP Morgan EMBI data for
Argentina, Brazil,  Mexico, Venezuela and the non-Latin EMBI index over the period from January 1991  to
March 2002. The indicator is the percentage of the total variance of  the (normalized)  spreads explained by
their first principal component, constructed using a rolling window of 48 months.  We smooth the resulting
series by averaging the values obtained for each data point over the 48 windows in which it appears.  As a
robustness  check,  we redo the exercise using a broader set of countries - Argentina,  Bulgaria,  Brazil,
Ecuador,  Mexico,  Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Poland, Russia and Venezuela.  However, not all of them possess
observations over the entire sample period. We also construct altemative global indicators incorporating the
effects of US interest rates on country spreads. Finally, we redo these experiments  with alternative  window
lengths. All these specification changes have only minor effects on the qualitative results.  See Fiess (2002)
for details.
13Figure 2.6. Sovereign Spreads: The Role of Global Factors
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14The above analysis of  country  spreads  can be extended to capital flows with the
aid of a  suitable  econornetric  model  of their  determinants,  a  task  undertaken  in  Fiess
(2002). In brief, the model describes the simultaneous determination of flows and spreads
making  use  of the  decomposition  of the  latter  into  their  global  and  local  components
shown above.  Empirical  implementation  of this framework  shows that capital  flows are
negatively  affected  by both  global  and local risk.  In turn, local  risk rises with the  total
volume of debt and the primary fiscal deficit, both expressed as ratios to GDP.
Using this  framework,  we  can assess  the roles of local and  global factors  in the
observed  time path of capital  flows to Argentina.  This is done in Figure  2.7, which plots
the variation in flows to Argentina  attributable  to local  factors,  as a fraction of the total
variation  explained  by  ithe  model.9 The  figure  shows  that  Argentina-specific  factors
played a  negligible  role  until  1998,  but  became  increasingly  important  following  the
Russian  crisis,  and  especially  after  October  2000.  Indeed,  from  the  latter  date  up  to
September  2001, local factors account for two-thirds of the total variation in capital  flows
to Argentina explained by the model.
Figure 2.7. Capital Inflows  to Argentina: Contribution of Local Factors
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9  Like in the previous figures,  we use a 48-month moving window for these exercises. Alternative window
lengths result in qualitatively similar results.
15On the  whole,  these  modelbased  results  reinforce  the  more  informal  evidence
shown earlier that Argentina was not affected as severely as other countries by the global
slowdown  in capital flows  from  1999  onwards.  On the contrary,  the econometric  models
confirm  that the sharp  reversal of flows to Argentina in late 2000  and 2001 was mainly
driven  by  country-specific  factors.  This  strongly  suggests  that  the  "sudden  stop"  of
capital flows in 2000/2001  acted as an amplifier of the effects  of domestic  factors, rather
than being the primary, exogenous cause behind the crisis.
We  can summarize  this section  by noting that Argentina was not hit harder than
other LAC countries by the terms of trade decline after the Asian crisis, nor by the global
capital  flow  reversals  and  spread  increases  that followed the  Russian crisis,  mr by the
U.S.  and worldwide  slowdown  that started  in  2001.  On the contrary,  the  sharp  capital
flow  reversal  from  2000  onwards  was  primarily  an  Argentina-specific  phenomenon
driven mostly by Argentina-specific  factors.
Since external  shocks were no worse  in Argentina  than in the rest of the  region,
the  fact  that  after  1998  Argentina's  performance  fell  short  from  that  of other  LAC
countries must reflect either higher vulnerabilities  or weaker policy responses,  or both.  It
is  true  that  Argentina  was  particularly  affected  by other  external  events,  such  as  the
appreciation  of the dollar  and the  depreciation  of major trading-partner  currencies.  But
such differential  effects  were a consequence  of policy decisions  - the peg to the  dollar
under  the  Currency  Board  arrangement  - and  the  handicaps  that  they  created.  Most
important among the  latter were  the  significant balance  sheet  vulnerabilities  to  external
shocks that plagued the Argentine economy.  We next turn to these issues.
III.  OVERVALUATION  AND  DEFLATIONARYADJUSTMENT  UNDER THE
HARD PEG: Why old lessons  about optimal currency areas should not be forgotten
Our next task is to assess the role of the dollar peg in Argentina's malaise - how it
added to  the  economy's  external  vulnerability  and  how it hampered  adjustment  to real
shocks.
The pros and cons of irrevocable pegs,  such as that adopted by Argentina  under
Convertibility,  have been traditionally  assessed  in the  framework  of Optimal  Currency
Area (OCA) theory.  In brief, the latter suggests that an  irrevocable  peg is more likely to
be beneficial  for the  client  country if it  trades  a lot with the  anchor,  and if client  and
anchor are not exposed  to significant asymmetric  shocks which would demand monetary
policy responses of different sign in the two countries.  If the scope for asymmetric  shocks
is substantial, the peg might still make sense if the client country can easily adjust to real
shocks through nominal price and wage  flexibility,  or through  other mechanisms  such as
a system of fiscal transfers and/or unrestricted  labor mobility with the anchor.
Argentina did not meet any of these  conditions for an OCA with the U.S.  dollar.
The  U.S.  accounted  for  less  that  15  percent  of  Argentina's  total  trade,  equivalent  to
16under 3 percent  of its  GDP,  leaving  a  very  large  scope  for  asymmetric  shocks  (Table
3. 1).1°  Wage  and  price  flexibility  were  limited,  making  adjustment  to  real  shocks
difficult.
Table 3.1.  Argentina's Trade Structure (2001)
Geographical composition of
imports plus exports
(percentage of the total)
Brazil  25%
Main LAC w/o Brazil (*)  17%
USA  14%
Europe  (**)  20%
Rest of the world  24%
Notes:
(*) Bolivia, Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Guatemala,  Mexico,  Penr,  Paraguay,
Uruguay,  and Venezuela.
(**) Austria,  Belgium,  Switzerland,  Czech  Republic, Germany, Spain, Finland,
France,  United Kingdom,  Greece,  Italy, Netherlands,  Norway,  Poland, Portugal,
Sweden,  and Switzerland.
Source: International  Monetary Fund - Direction of Trade.
Indeed,  the adoption of Convertibility was not guided by OCA arguments,  but by
the  credibility-enhancing  effect  that  renouncing  monetary  discretion  was  expected  to
have after many years of acute monetary  instability, as well  as by Argentinean  investors'
stated  preference  for  dollar-denominated  assets.  As  we  shall  see  below,  however,  this
purported shortcut to credibility left the economy highly exposed to disturbances.
A.  WAS THERE AN OVERVALUATION?  WHERE DID IT COME FROM?
Argentina's  real  effective  (that  is,  trade  weighted)  exchange  rate  (henceforth
REER)  experienced a considerable  appreciation  during the  1990s."  Between  1990  and
2001,  the  REER  rose12 by  over  75  percent  (Figure  3.1).  The  bulk of the  appreciation
developed  before  1994.  In fact,  the REER depreciated  after that date and until  1996,  but
then appreciated again to reach its peak in 2001.
10 In fact, on these grounds a peg to the Euro would have made more sense than a peg to the U.S. dollar.
See Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002).
1 Trade  weights are taken from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics  and correspond to  1995.  They refer
to goods trade (imports and exports).
12 Throughout this note we define the RER so that an increase represents a real appreciation.
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This  evolution  of  the  REER  was  duly  reflected  in  Argentina's  export
performance.  While  real  exports  did  show  positive  growth  over the  decade,  they  grew
less  than in comparable  countries,  and their  rate of expansion  was closely  associated  to
the  evolution  of the  REER.  During  the  initial  real  appreciation  at the  time  when  the
currency board was established, Argentina's  exports stagnated. As the REER depreciated
after  1993,  exports  expanded  vigorously,  at  rates  sirnilar  to,  or  higher  than,  those
experienced  by  other  countries.  When  the  REER  started  appreciating  again  in  1997,
export performance fell significantly behind that of comparable  countries. (Table 3.2).
Real  appreciation  is  not  necessarily  a  symptom  of  imbalance  in  need  of
correction.  Indeed,  during  the  1990s  - especially  in  the  early  part of the  decade  --  a
number of reasons  were offered by different observers in order to explain the persistent
real  appreciation  of the peso  as an equilibrium phenomenon.  Most importantly,  it was
argued that the efficiency-enhancing  reforms of the early  1990s had led to  a permanent
productivity  increase in the tradable sector of the Argentine  economy, which would have
justified a permanent REER appreciation.  Nevertheless,  over the  final two or three years
of Convertibility  an  increasing  number  of independent  observers  and  financial  market
actors expressed the view that the peso was overvalued  - although the precise extent of
the overvaluation was disputed, depending on the measure of the equilibrium REER used
as benchmark of comparison.  13
13  For example, Deutsche Bank perceived the peso to be some 20 percent overvalued in real terms in mid-
2000.  See also Sachs (2002),  Rodrik (2002)  and Hausmann and Velasco  (2002) for various assessments  of
the degree of overvaluation of the peso.
18Table 3.2. Average Annual Growth of Real Exports
(Goods  and Non-Factor Services,  Percentages)
1992-1993  1994-1997  1998-2001  1992-2001
Argentina  1.8  14.4  3.6  7.6
7 major  LAC countries w/o Argentina  (*)  7.7  11.1  7.8  9.1
Upper middle-income LDC's (**)  7.8  11.9  8.9  9.8
World  3.8  8.4  6.6  6.8
Memo Item:
Argentina's  REER growth
(appreciation  +)  10.4  -4.1  5.8  2.8
Notes:
(*) Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,  Colombia,  Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
(**} World  Bank classification: American  Samoa,  Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados,  Botswana,
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia,  Czech  Republic, Dominica,  Estonia,  Gabon, Grenada, Hungary,  Isle
of Man,  Latvia, Lebanon,  Libya,  Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta,  Mauritius, Mayotte,  Mexico, Oman, Palau,
Panama, Poland,  Puerto RioD, Saudi Arabia,  Seychelles, Slovak Republic,  St.  Kitts and Nevis,  St. Lucia,
Trinidad and Tobago,  Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Source: World Development  Indicators -World  Bank.
Such views were  most often based on simple comparisons  of the prevailing  real
exchange  rate  with its  historical  value,  under  the  view  that  the  equilibrium  REER  is
constant  - the  so-called purchasing  power parity (PPP) view.  Figure  3.1  illustrates  the
use of this approach to assess the misalignment  of the Argentine  REER over the  1990s,
taking  as equilibrium  value  the  REER  average  over the  last  four decades  (1960-2001).
The  latter  is  depicted by  the  horizontal  line  in the  figure.  Comparison  with the  actual
REER suggests that the peso  was initially undervalued in  1990,  but became  increasingly
overvalued  after the  introduction  of the  Convertibility  Law in  1991.  The overvaluation
peaked initially in  1993,  (leclined later through 1996,  and rose again to nearly 50 percent
in 2001.
However,  this  approach  neglects  two  important  factors  that  may  cause  the
equilibrium  REER to change over time The first one is the relative  level of productivity
across countries.  Other things  equal,  an increase  in productivity  in traded goods sectors
relative  to  nontraded  goods  sectors  in  a  given  country  above  that  experienced  by its
trading partners should lead to a REER appreciation  --  precisely the argument advanced
by some observers to justify the rapid real appreciation of the Argentine peso in the early
1990s.14
The  second  ingredient  is  the  adequacy  of  tlh  current  account  to  sustain
equilibrium  capital  flows.  The real  exchange  rate  must be consistent with a balance  of
payments  position  that does  not lead  to explosive  accumulation  of external  assets  or
14 This is the so-called Balassa-Samuelson  effect.
19liabilities.  In this  framework,  the equilibrium  REER is that which allows  the economy to
achieve a sustainable  long-run net foreign asset position. 15
Our  assessment  of  Argentina's  equilibrium  real  exchange  is  based  on  an
analytical  model  encompassing  these  two  ingredients.  Thus,  we  take  into  account
simultaneously the  internal  (productivity) and external  (asset position) equilibrium of the
economy  to draw  inferences  about the  overall  equilibrium or disequilibrium  position  of
the real exchange rate. 16
Empirical  application  of this  analytical  framework  to  Argentina  using  data  for
1960-2001  yields  the  estimated  equilibrium  REER  shown  in  Figure  3.1.  The  figure
suggests  that  the  trajectory  of the  equilibrium  REER  consists  of two  stages.  First,  an
initial real appreciation  in  1991-93  - particularly  sharp in the first two years.  Second,  a
steady  depreciation  from  1994  on,  which  by  2001  has brought  the  equilibrium  REER
below its 1990 value.
The  equilibrium  and actual  REER are  compared in Figure  3.2, which presents the
percentage  deviation  of the  actual  REER  from  its  equilibrium  value,  along with the  95
percent  confidence  bands  derived  from econometric  estimation  of the  equilibrium  real
exchange  rate  model.  In  the  figure,  a  positive  value  indicates  overvaluation,  and  a
negative  one means  undervaluation.  The  graph reveals two stages of real misalignment.
Between  1990 and  1996,  the REER was undervalued,  although after  1991 the degree of
undervaluation  was  fairly  small.  From  1997  on,  however,  the  REER  exceeded  its
equilibrium  counterpart  by a  widening  margin,  resulting  in an increasing  overvaluation.
By 2001, the REER exceeded its equilibrium value by 53 percent.17
Notice  the  contrast  between  the  degree  of  misalignment  derived  from  the
equilibrium  model and  that arising from  the simple-minded  PPP calculations  mentioned
earlier.  While by both yardsticks the peso was substantially overvalued by 2001, the PPP
calculations  imply that the  overvaluation  of the  peso developed  basically between  1991
and  1993,  with little  change  afterwards,  while  the  latter  suggests that  the  overvaluation
arose  only  in  the  last  few  years  of Convertibility.  What  lies  behind  these  contrasting
assessments  ? As discussed  earlier, the analytical  model used here encompasses two key
determinants  of the  time  path  of the  equilibrium  REER:  (i)  the  relative  prodictivity
differential  between Argentina and her trading partners,  and (ii) Argentina's net foreign
asset position. It is useful to examine them in turn.
15  While  this  stock-based  asset  view  of real  exchange  rate  determination  has  become  mainstream,  an
alternative  flow-based  view  assigns  to  exogenous  capital  flow  fluctuations  a  dominant  role  in  the
determination  of the  equilibrium  REER.  According  to  this  approach,  the  equilibrium  level  of the real
exchange  rate  is that which makes the current account balance  equal the  (exogenously  given)  supply of net
foreign financing.
16 The details are spelled out in Alberola et al. (1999) and Alberola,  L6pez and Serven  (2003).
17 To be specific, this figure is the difference  between the logarithms of the actual and equilibrium REER.
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21Figure  3.3  portrays  the  time  path of a  measure  of the  productivity  differential,
based  on  the  (log)  ratio  of nonitradable  to  tradable  prices  of Argentina  relative  to its
trading partners.  An  increase  represents  an  improvement  in  Argentina's  productivity
differential,  and calls for an appreciation of the equilibrium REER.  The figure suggests a
clear rise  in relative  productivity  in the  early  1990s and hence,  given other  things,  an
appreciation  of the  equilibrium  REER  between  1990  and  1993.  Much  of this  gain  in
productivity  is likely to reflect  efficiency gains  derived  from the end of hyperinflation
achieved  in  1991.  After  1993,  however,  there  were  no  additional  gains  in  relative
productivity,  and  in fact a partial  reversal  appears  to have  taken place  after  1994.  This
absence  of further productivity  gains appears  consistent with the  stalling of Argentina's
structural reform process in the second half of the decade.
If the  initial productivity gains  are largely responsible  for the appreciation of the
equilibrium  REER in the early  1990s,  its depreciation  in the late 1990s  is driven by the
changes in Argentina's  net foreign asset position, shown in Figure  3.4.  In the figure,  an
increase represents  a rise in Argentina's NFA position (relative to GDP) and hence calls
for an appreciation of the equilibrium  REER, given other things.
Figure 3.4. Net Foreign Assets
(Percent of GDP)
-10%







Source: Alberola,  L6pez and Serv6n (2003)
18  See Alberola,  L6pez and Serven (2003) for more details on the construction of  this measure.  An
alternative measure based on ratios of aggregate labor productivity yields broadly similar qualitative
results.
22The figure  displays an initial rise of NFA in 1991,  followed  by a steady decline
between  1993  and 2001,  during which the  NFA/GDP  ratio falls  by over 20  percentage
points.  The  decline  proceeds  at  a  particularly  fast  pace  after  1997.  In  the  face  of  a
stagnant productivity  differential,  as shown above, this deterioration  in the NFA position
is the driving  force behind the  steady depreciation  of the equilibrium  REER  in  the  late
1990s.
The  falling  NFA/GDP  position  is  largely  a  reflection  of  the  rising  trend  in
Argentina's  foreign  liabilities  relative  to  GDP over the  late  1990s,  which  resulted from
the combination  of substantial  current account deficits - particularly  large in  1997-99 -
and,  in the final years  of the decade,  a persistent  growth deterioration.  It is true  that by
1999-2000  Argentina's  current  account  imbalance,  while  large,  was  not  far  above the
region's norm  --  at least if the wide  surpluses of the  oil importing countries are excluded
from  the  comparison.  But  Argentina's  deficits  were  being  incurred  in the  midst of a
severe  recession with escalating  unemployment.  This suggests  that the  full-employment
current account deficit would have been much bigger than that actually observed. 1 9 In the
next  section  we examine  how  these  persistent  current  account  imbalances  relate  to the
fiscal gaps that developed over the decade.
Our empirical  frarnework allows  us to reassess  the role of external  shocks in the
misalignment of the Argentine peso. In particular,  we can gauge the impact of changes in
the  real  exchange  rates  of third  currencies.  It  has  been  argued  that  much  of the
overvaluation  of the peso can be  attributed to  the appreciation  of the U.S.  dollar in the
late  1990s  relative to the  currencies  of major  trading partners  of Argentina  - especially
the Euro  --,  and  also  to  the  Brazilian  devaluation  of 1999,  which  abruptly  reduced
Argentina's  competitiveness  vis-a-vis  its  top trading  partner.20 Arguably,  these are not
'external  shocks'  in  the  s,trict  sense  of the  tern,  but  self-inflicted  ones resulting  from
Argentina's  choice  of currency  regime  - they  are  a result of  'pegging  to  the  wrong
currency'.
We can assess the contribution of these factors to the overvaluation of the peso by
decomposing  the  latter  iinto  three  parts.  The  first  one  is  due  to  the  divergence  in
fundamentals  between  Argentina and the  U.S.,  which causes  the  equilibrium  REERs  of
the  dollar  and  the  peso  to  diverge.  This  reflects  primarily  tle pursuance  of policies
inconsistent with the dollar peg, which must eventually lead to misalignment if the peg is
'right'  for  the  Argentinean  economy.  In  turn,  the  other  two  components  reflect  the
inadequacy of the dollar peg itself. One  is just the overvaluation of the  dollar,  which is
translated  to the peso through  the dollar  peg. The other results from changes in the real
exchange  rates of third currencies  whose  weight  in Argentina's  total  trade  is  different
from their weight in  the UJ.S.  total trade  - clearly  the  case of the Brazilian  real.21 Note
19 This point is underscored by Roubini (2001).
20 In contrast,  adverse terms of trade  shocks had presumably a very modest impact on the extent of
misalignment of the peso. As already discussed, in 1998-99 Argentina's terms of trade declined by some 11
percent. However, the shock was only temporary,  and was reversed in 2000. In addition, the decline
followed a terms -of-trade  windfaLlI  in 1995-96.
21 See Alberola, L6pez and Serven  (2003) for further details on this decomposition.
23that,  in  the  former  case,  misalignment  results  from  pegging  to  a misaligned  anchor
currency,  while in the latter it results from asymmetries  in the trade structure of the client
and anchor countries.
The decomposition  is presented  in Figure  3.5,  which  shows  the  contribution  of
each of the  three  ingredients  to  the cumulative  change  in the  misalignment of the  peso
between  1997  and  2001.  As  shown  earlier,  these  were  the  years  during  which  the
overvaluation  developed.  Between those  dates, peso overvaluation  rose by 50 percent.22
The  figure  suggests  that  both  the  wrong  choice  of peg  and  inconsistent  fundamentals
were  behind the mounting overvaluation of the peso  in the final years of Convertibility.
Indeed,  the  former  accounts  for  27  of the  50  percentage  points  of  overvaluation
accumulated  between  1997  and  2001,  while  the  latter  contributed  the  remaining  23
percentage points.
Figure 3.5.  Sources of cumulative peso overvaluation,  1997-2001
(Percentages)
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The graph also shows that most of the misalignment due to inadequacy of the peg
can be traced  to the overvaluation  of the U.S.  dollar in the late  1990s.  In  contrast,  trade
structure asymmetries  worked against  overvaluation prior to  1999, because the Brazilian
real  was itself appreciating  in those  years.  The figure  clearly shows  that Brazil's abrupt
devaluation  in 1999  added significantly  to the misalignment of the peso.  In fact,  Figure
3.2  above  showed  that  the  overvaluation of the peso  increased  by almost 20  percent  in
22 As before, this figure and the ones that follow refer to logarithmic deviations.
241999.  Numerical  calculations  suggest  that  the  depreciation  of  the  real  was  directly
responsible for about half of this amount (1l%).23
Finally,  it  is  important  to  note  that  these  calculations  may  understate  the  true
contribution  of  the  dollar  overvaluation  and  the  depreciation  of  the  real  to  the
misalignment  of the peso.  To  the  extent  that the  overvaluation due  to these two  factors
led to larger current account deficits over time, and hence  declining net foreign assets and
a  falling equilibrium  REER,  such  factors  would be  indirectly  responsible  for additional
peso  overvaluation.  All  in  all,  it is  safe  to  conjecture  that  the  choice of a  'wrong peg'
accounts for the majority of the observed overvaluation of the peso.
In summary, we conclude that the peso had become substantially  overvalued after
1997, in  the  face of stagnant productivity  and mounting  net foreign liabilities relative  to
GDP.  We  find  that  the  appreciating  U.S.  dollar  and  the  depreciating  Brazilian  real
accounted  directly  for  over  half of tir overvaluation.  The  rest can  be attributed to  the
divergence  in  fundamentals  between  Argentina  and  the  U.S.  Such  divergence  largely
reflects the external  imbalances  that Argentina  incurred  tbroughout the decade, which, as
we shall see  later, were mainly the result of persistent public deficits.
Importantly,  we  reach  these  conclusions  in  a  framework  in  which  exogenous
capital flow fluctuations play no role in the determination of the equilibrium  REER. This
is  consistent  with  the  analysis  in  the  preceding  section,  which  found  that  factors
governing  global  capital  flows  became  relatively  less  important  in  explaining  the
observed pattem of flows to Argentina in the late  1990s.
B.  PERSISTENCE OF MISALI GNMENTS AND DEFLATIONARY  ADJUSTMENT UNDER HARD PEGS
Real misalignments  can and do occur under  both fixed and flexible  exchange  rate
regimes.  But the key difference  is that under a floating regime  a real misalignment  can be
eliminated  quickly  through  a  nominal  exchange  rate  adjustment.  Thus,  if a  temporary
spending  boom,  say,  causes  the  real  exchange  rate  to appreciate  above  its  equilibrium
value, as the spending boom unwinds  the nominal exchange rate will typically depreciate,
helping eliminate the real overvaluation. 24
In  a pegged  regime,  in contrast,  the  real exchange  rate  adjustment  has to  occur
through  changes  in  the  domestic  price  level  vis-A-vis  foreign  prices.  Disturbances
requiring  a  real  depreciation  - such  as  the  Brazil  devaluation  or  the  U.S.  dollar
appreciation just reviewed - call for a decline in the inflation differential vis-A-vis trading
partners  in  order  to  restore  REER  equilibrium.  If trading  partner  inflation  is  low,  this'.
means  that  domestic  prices  need  to fall  in  absolute terms.  Under nominal  inertia  - of
wages and other prices  - deflation  in  turn requires  a recession,  making  the  adjustment
process  slow  and  costly  in terms  of output  and  employment.  This  generates  a second
23 See Alberola, L6pez and Serv6n (2003). This figure  is in fact very similar to those reported at the time by
financial market analysts.
24 Because of this, large and persistent overvaluations  are less frequently observed under floating than
under fixed regimes.  See  Goldfajn and Valdes (1999).
25difference  with floating regimes:  in the presence of a large overvaluation,  the fact that the
required  adjustment process  may  entail  large  (and politically unpalatable)  output losses
can in turn undermine confidence  in the sustainability of the peg itself - especially  when
fiscal institutions are weak, as was the case in Argentina (see Section IV below).
The  cost  of adjustment  under  a  hard  peg  can  be  illustrated  on  the  basis  of
empirical  evidence  on  the  adjustment  to  real  disturbances  from  a  large  sample  of
industrial  and developing  countries  under different  exchange  rate regimes.  Figures  3.6
and 3.7 portray the  adjustment of countries with floating regimes and hard pegs (such as
Argentina's  currency  board)  to  a  trajectory  of  the  terns  of  trade  similar  to  that
experienced  by  Argentina  in  1998-99  - a cumulative  drop of 11  percent.25 The  figures
show the time path of output and the real exchange rate,  in percentage deviation from the
initial (pre-shock) level.
Figure  3.6 shows the  adjustment of real  GDP. In floating regimes  the output loss
is small - it never exceeds  0.5  percent of initial  GDP. In hard pegs,  in contrast,  the terms
of trade  deterioration  leads  to  a  sizable  output contraction  in the short-run  - up to  2.5
percent by  the  second  year.  The  initial  contraction  is  followed by a partial  recovery  of
GDP, which approaches  the level of the floating regime by the fifth year.
The other side of the coin is shown in Figure 3.7, which presents the time path of
the real  exchange  rate, again  distinguishing between  floating regimes  and hard pegs.  In
floating regimes, the terms of trade loss causes  an immediate real depreciation.  The  RER
depreciates by over 1.5 percent on impact, and continues to depreciate over the following
periods  - by  up  to 5 percent  by  the  third  year.  In  contrast,  under  hard pegs  the  real
depreciation  is  gradual  and  of very modest  magnitude  - less  than  2  percent  after ten
periods - in spite of the sharp output contraction.  Moreover,  it is possible to show that
the  adjustment patterns  under  both regimes  are  significantly  different  in  the  statistical
sense.
These  empirical  results  conform  with  the  experience  of  Argentina.  As  noted
earlier,  Argentina's REER overvaluation  was partly a reflection of specific  disturbances
to which the  currency board was vulnerable  - such as the appreciation of the US  dollar
and the Brazilian real devaluation.  In the adjustment to these disturbances, prices did fall,
but by a very modest magnitude - a total around 3 percent over  1998-2001.  This price
deflation  was wholly insufficient  to offset the  impact of the  shocks  on the misalignment
of  the  REER  --  even  though  nominal  deflation  was  the  only  way  to  achieve  REER
adjustment under  the  hard peg.  However,  a  faster deflation  would have been  politically
very  difficult,  as  it  would  have  required  an  even  deeper  recession  and  higher
unemployment than actually witnessed in 1999-2001.
25 This is based on an extension of earlier work by Christian Broda (2001).
26Figure 3.6. GDP Response to a Terms of Trade Deterioration
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27C.  SUMMING UP
To  sum  up,  we  can highlight  four  facts  that emerge  from the  discussion.  First,
taking into account developments  in both ArWntina's relative productivity and its foreign
asset position, we find that the appreciation of the peso up to  1993 was to a large extent
an equilibrium phenomenon,  reflective of efficiency improvements  that took place  at the
beginning of the 1990s. On the  other hand, we also find that the peso had become grossly
overvalued  by  1999-2001.  We  reach  these  conclusions  in  a  framework  in  which
exogenous  shifts in capital flows play no role.
Second,  a considerable  portion of the overvaluation of the  peso by  2001  can be
traced  to  the  U.S.  dollar  appreciation  against  the  Euro,  as  well  as  the  Brazilian  real
depreciation.  This shows the dangers of a hard peg adopted in violation of standard OCA
criteria, which in the  case of Argentina pointed clearly against the  U.S.  dollar as anchor
currency  - even  though  finance-based  arguments  may  have  pointed  in  the  opposite
direction, as we shall discuss later.
Third,  the  experience  of Argentina  also  provides  a  vivid  illustration  of the
rigidities  imposed  by  a  hard  peg.  The  observed  degree  of downward  price  flexibility
proved  wholly  insufficient  to  absorb  the  adverse  real  shocks  that  impacted  on  the
economy in the  late  1990s.26 While  deflation provided  the only  mechanism  for REER
adjustment under the peg, the deflation required to adjust to the shocks would have been
politically  hard  or  impossible  to  achieve.27 In  this  regard,  the  hard  peg  offered  the
mechanism  for a persistent  and large  REER misalignment  to go  unchecked.  As we  shall
see below, it also hid from public view a rapidly mounting fiscal solvency problem.
Finally,  a key  ingredient  behind  the  mounting  overvaluation  of the  peso  after
1996 was the persistent decline  in Argentina's equilibrium  NFA position. This in turn can
be traced to the large external imbalances  that developed over the  1990s, which led to an
escalation  in external  liabilities  relative  to  GDP  - especially  in the  context  of slow  or
negative  growth  at  the  end  of  the  decade.  As  we  shall  discuss  below,  public  sector
imbalances were a major element in this process.
IV.  FISCAL VULNERABILITIES:  Mismanagement in the boom and large fiscal
contingencies  associated with adverse external shocks
Many  observers have  blamed the Argentine  crisis  on the lack of fiscal discipline
which was  essential  to preserve  the  Currency  Board.28 Others, in contrast,  have argued
that even  until mid-2001  conventional  debt  and  fiscal  indicators  appeared no  worse  in
26 This is also in accordance with the international evidence  reported by Goldfajn and Valdes (1999). They
show that once a real overvaluation exceeds  some threshold  (around 30%), it becomes very difficult to
reverse via nominal deflation., and a collapse of the nominal exchange rate is virtually assured to occur.
27 This view is also stated by Rodrik (2002) and Sachs (2002).
28  See in particular Teijeiro (2001) and Mussa (2002).
28Argentina  than in  other emerging  markets  in Latin  America  and  elsewhere  (Table  4.1),
and view  the  fiscal deterioration  mainly as a casualty of the recession.  The contribution
of  Social  Security  refomi  to  the  fiscal  imbalances  of the  1990s  has  also  attracted
attention. 29 In this section we assess those claims.
Table 4.1.  Debt Indicators in Emerging Markets
PLiblic Debt  Public Debt Interest Payments
Percentage of Percentage of  Percentage of Percentage of
GDP  GDP  Tax Revenue  Debt
Argentina  62.2  5.4  30.8  8.7
Brazil  65.0  9.5  33.8  15.5
Colombia  50.8  5.0  25.3  9.8
Mexico  27.7  2.6  25.7  9.4
Venezuela  35.3  3.3  18.7  9.3
Poland  39.1  2.9  11.0  7.4
Russia  52.3  3.0  7.9  5.7
Turkey  85.1  23.7  133.1  27.8
Source: Goldman Sachs and IMF.
Note: Data are for 2000 except for Argentina (2001).
A.  FISCAL POLICY DURING BOOM AND BUST
We  begin  our  inquiry  by  examining  how  and  when  fiscal  vulnerabilities
developed  during  the nineties.  Most analysts  have  pointed  to the  deterioration  of fiscal
balances  (both  at  the  Federal  and provincial  levels)  and  the  corresponding  increase  in
debt indicators  since  1995  and, especially,  since  1999,  which  are shown  in Figures  4.1
and 4.2 respectively. 30
29 See  Teijeiro (2001)  and Hausm,ann and Velasco (2002).
30 Argentina's fiscal balances during the first part of the nineties look better than they actually were, as they
include some privatization receipts above the line and hide important fiscal liabilities (in both Federal and
Provincial pension systems and other items) that were later partially recognized, especially  from 1994
onwards. Public debt decreased up to 1993 thanks to large privatization receipts and the Brady deal, while
from 1994 onward the debt path reflects the recognition of some of the previously hidden liabilities (see
Teijeiro 2001). Also, from 1995 on the Federal Government absorbed  cash flow deficits previously
included in the Provincial pension  system. This latter change does not affect the consolidated (Federal +
Provinces) deficit but only its composition.
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30However, it is true that the observed deterioration in Argentina's  fiscal balance in
the  final  years  of the  decade  reflects  in  part  the  effects  of declining  growth  on  tax
collection  and those  of rising interest  rates on debt  service.  To assess  the fiscal  stance
adopted  by  the authorities,  we need  to gauge  the effects  of these  factors  beyond their
immediate control.
Consider  first the  effects  of cyclical  variation  in  output  on  the  fiscal balance.
Unfortunately,  we do not have sufficient  data to correct  for this factor at the level of the
consolidated public sector.,  but only for the Federal government.  Nevertheless,  Figure 4.1
shows that the time profile of the Federal and consolidated  deficits is roughly similar,  so
the  cyclically-adjusted  fiscal  stance  should  also  be  fairly  similar  for both  government
definitions.
Figure 4.3. GDP and Potential GDP
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Construction  of cyclically-adjusted  fiscal figures  typically  requires  estimates  of
potential  output,  whose  calculation  near  sample  endpoints  is  subject  to  considerable
inaccuracy  due  to  the  difficulty in distinguishing  between temporary  output movements
and  changes  in  trend  at  the  beginning  and  end  of the  sample  period.31 To  partially
remedy  this  problem,  we  construct  two  potential  output  estimates  - one  through  a
Hodrick-Prescott  (HP) filter,  and another using linear extrapolation.  Figure 4.3 shows that
the HP method appears  to umderestimate  potential output at the end of the period  --  as it
projects zero or even negative potential growth  --  while  the linear extrapolation probably
31 See Orphanides  and van Norden (2002) for a discussion.
31overestimates  it.  Thus,  we  opt  for  a  middle-of-the-way  estimate  (shown  in  the  figure)
between these two.
Using  this  estimate,  we  can  correct  the  Federal  primary  balance  for  cyclical
revenue effects.32 This yields the  structural primary balance of the Federal government,
shown in Figure 4.4. It deteriorated markedly (by nearly 1.5  % of GDP) during the boom
period  from  the  end  of  1995  to  mid  1998,  and  improved  significantly  hereafter.  The
improvement  was punctuated by brief periods  of relaxation,  mostly during the run up to
the election at the end of 1999.3
Figure 4.4. Current and Structural Primary Budget Balance  of
Federal Government
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Indeed,  estimates  of the  fiscal  impulse,  defined  as the  change  in the  structural
primary  deficit  relative  to  GDP,  also  reveal  a  significant  expansionary  change  in the
stance  of the  Federal  government  during the  boom  period,  followed  by  progressive
adjustment  after mid  1998  except  for a few  months  in the  run up to  the  1999  election
(Figure 4.5).
32 To do this, we use a revenue elasticity to cyclical GDP of 1.14, which is obtained from  a regression of
current revenues on trend and cyclical  GDP.
33 Powell (2002) suggests that inclusion of the Provinces in the analysis would reveal an even larger
relaxation in that year.
32Figure 41.5. Fiscal Impulse of Federal Government
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33The  above  analysis  is based on the  cyclically-adjusted  primary  deficit estimates
described earlier.  To assess its robustness,  we  can examine  an alternative  measure of the
change  in the fiscal stance,  due to Blanchard (1993), which avoids taking a stand on the
nature  of business fluctuations  or on trend-cycle  decomposition  techniques. It compares
actual  revenue  and  expenditure  with  those  that would  have  happened  if the  previous
period's "economic  environment" (as described by unemployment  and trend output)  had
prevailed.  Such  calculation  is  reported  in  Figure  4.6.  The  qualitative  pattern  is  very
similar to that shown earlier  in Figure 4.5:  a major expansionary  change  in fiscal policy
from  mid  1996  to  1998,  reversed  after  that  date  (with brief interruptions  in 2000  and
2001).
Table 4.2.  Interest Payments on Public Debt
Interest  Change  in  Contribution to
Payments  Interest  Change  in
on Debt  Burden  Interest Burden
Percent of  Percent of  Debt  Interest
GDP  GDP  Volume  Rate
Effect  Effect
1991  2.8
1992  1.6  -1.1  -0.4  -0.8
1993  1.4  -0.2  0.1  -0.3
1994  1.6  0.1  0.1  0.0
1995  1.9  0.3  0.2  0.1
1996  2.1  0.2  0.1  0.1
1997  2.3  0.3  0.1  0.2
1998  2.6  0.3  0.2  0.1
1999  3.4  0.8  0.5  0.3
2000  4.1  0.7  0.3  0.4
2001  5.4  1.3  1.0  0.3
TOTAL
1991-2001  2.6  2.2  0.5
1993-2001  3.9  2.4  1.5
Source: Ministerio de Economia de la  Republica Argentina and Intemational
Monetary Fund.
However,  the  adjustment  in the  structural  primary  balance  after  1998  was  not
enough  to  compensate  for  growing  interest  rate  payments.  Figure  4.7  shows  how  the
Federal  government's  structural  overall  balance,  calculated  as  the  structural  primary
balance plus actual interest payments, was kept in negative territory (around 1% of GDP)
since the end of 1996. Indeed, interest payments rose from around 2% of GDP in 1995/96
34to 4.1%  in 2000  and  5.4%  in 2001.  As  Table  4.2  shows,  however,  less than  half of the
increase in the interest bill between  1995 and 2001  can be attributed to the rise in implicit
interest rates on public debt -- which accelerated after the Russian crisis and especially  in
1999-2001  due to the  perceived  weakening  of Argentine  fundamentals.  The rest of the
increase  in the interest burden was due to the growth in the stock of outstanding debt. The
additional  deterioration in the Federal  government's  overall balance,  beyond that due to
changing  fiscal  stance  and  interest  charges,  can  be  attributed  to  the  effects  of the
slowdown, and is captured by the gap between the two deficit measures  in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7. Current and Structural Overall Federal Budget Balance
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Source: Ministerio de Economia de la Republica Argentina and  Ministero de Obras y Servicios Publicos.
More  often  than not  Latin American  fiscal  problems  have originated  in booms,
when weak fiscal institutions and policy complacency  do not facilitate the achievement of
surpluses.  As  a  consequence  fiscal  policy  has  to  be  pro-cyclical  also  in  bad  times,
contributing to a deepening of recessions and social tensions, and occasionally ending up
in a  severe  fiscal  crisis.  Argentina  in  the  nineties  was  no  exception  to  this unfortunate
Latin American policy tradition. 34
34 The procyclicality  of fiscal  policy in LAC has  been examined  in Gavin and Perotti (1996);  Gavin,  et al.
(1996) and Perry (2002)
35B.  FISCAL SOLVENCY ASSESSMENTS
We next explore debt sustainability. First, we attempt to mimic debt sustainability
exercises  on the basis of growth expectations  formed using the  infonnation  available  in
each  year.  These  exercises,  reported  in Table  4.3,  reveal  that  declining  future  growth
projections (influenced  by the deflationary adjustment under the hard peg) may have been
even  more  important  than  implicit  public  debt  interest  rate  increases  in  shaping
perceptions  about fiscal sustainability.  Indeed, assuming that markets assessed long-term
growth  potential  based  on  a  (3  and  5-year)  moving  average  of  past  growth,  the
simulations indicate  that by the year 2000, and certainly by 2001,  debt sustainability was
clearly  open  to  question,  in  the  sense  that  the  required  primary  balance  of  the
consolidated  government approached or even exceeded 4% of GDP, a figure that looked
unlikely  given  Argentine  fiscal  history  and  institutions.  In  practice,  although  fiscal
discipline  had been a concern  for years, it is fair to say that most analysts in investment
banks  and elsewhere  began  to  seriously  question  fiscal  solvency  in these years  and not
before. It should be pointed out, however, that Argentine economists  centered the debate
in the electoral  year of 1999 on the need for further  fiscal adjustment and that the  Fiscal
Responsibility  Law  was  enacted  in mid  1999  as  a  means  to  guarantee  fiscal solvency.
Non-compliance  with its goals in the run up to the election and afterwards  contributed to
undermine  confidence in solvency.
Table 4.3. Indicators of Fiscal Sustainability
Average  Implicit  Consolidated  Sustainable  Sustainable
Growth  Interest Rate  Gov. Primary  Balance  Balance
Rate  on Gov. Debt  Balance  (a)  (b)
(three  preceding  (av.  growth rate  (av. growth  rate
year average)  based  on last 3  based on last 5
year observations)  year observations)
Percentage  Percentage  Percentage of  Percentage of  Percentage of
GDP  GDP  GDP
1991  0.7  8.6  -0.4  2.7  2.8
1992  5.7  6.2  1.4  0.1  1.4
1993  7.3  5.0  1.2  n.s.p.  0.5
1994  6.5  5.1  -0.1  n.s.p.  n.s.p.
1995  2.6  5.4  -1.0  0.8  0.1
1996  2.8  5.6  -1.3  0.9  0.4
1997  3.6  6.1  0.2  0.9  0.6
1998  5.8  6.4  0.6  0.2  0.9
1999  2.9  7.1  -1.6  1.7  2.0
2000  -0.1  8.0  0.3  3.9  2.5
2001  -2.9  8.7  -1.4  6.0  4.0
Note:
n.s.p. means no sustainability problem.
Source:  Estimates  based on IMF and Ministerio de Economia de la  Repuiblica Argentina data.
The protracted deflationary adjustment to the external shocks  imposed by the hard
peg  to  the dollar  (as  discussed  above)  had  thus  a  major  effect  on  debt  sustainability
36perceptions,  through  two  channels.  On  the  one  hand,  it  reduced  future  growth
expectations,  and on the other it made further fiscal adjustment more difficult and painful
as  the  ratio  of revenues  to  GDP  collapsed.  In this  context,  further  tax  hikes  (like  the
"impuestazo" in 2000)  or expenditure  cuts (like  those undertaken  during the second half
of 2001) aggravated the recession and the ensuing social and political tensions.
Table 4.4. Fiscal Sustainability and the Exchange Rate
Debt  Output  Debt Output  Consolidated  Sustainable  Sustainable
Ratio  Ratio  Gov. Primary  Balance  Balance
Adjusted  Balance  (av.  growth rate  Adjusted
for RER  based  on  last 3  for RER
Misalignment  year observations)  Misalignment
Percentage of  Percentage of  Percentage  of
GDP  GDP  GDP
1991  32.3%  28.0%  -0.4  2.7  2.1
1992  26.1%  23.9%  1.4  0.1  0.1
1993  28.7%  27.7%  1.2  n.s.p.  n.s.p.
1994  30.9%  29.1%  -0.1  n.s.p.  n.s.p.
1995  34.8%  31.6%  -1.0  0.8  0.8
1996  36.6%  34.9%  -1.3  0.9  0.9
1997  38.1%  39.4%  0.2  0.9  0.9
1998  40.9%  46.2%  0.6  0.2  0.2
1999  47.6%  63.2%  -1.6  1.7  1.9
2000  50.9%  70.6%  0.3  3.9  5.1
2001  62.2%  95.0%  -1.4  6.0  8.4
Note:
n.s.p.  means no sustainability problem.
Even more,  the observed adjustment  in the  structural primary balance  was clearly
insufficient if we take irnto  account both the direct  and indirect  effects of exchange  rate
overvaluation  since  1997  on  the  balance  sheet  of the  government.  The  overvaluation
implied that measures of sustainability based on the observed ratio of public debt to GDP
understated by a considerable  margin the public sector's difficulties,  as most public  debt
was  denominated  in  dollars  while  government  assets  (in particular  its  capacity  to  tax)
were not.  Thus, a real  depreciation restoring  real exchange  rate  equilibrium would have
raised public  debt ratios  by a large amount  - up to  20-30  percentage  points  of GDP in
2000-2001,  as shown in Table  4.4. It  is important  to note  that this would have  occurred
irrespective  of whether  the  real depreciation  was  achieved  under Convertibility  through
nominal deflation or through a nominal devaluation and thus a collapse of the Currency
Board.3  In either case,  the real depreciation would have eventually revealed the reduced
capacity of the government to pay back its debt. Table 4.4 shows that once this is factored
into  the  analysis,  by  2001  government  solvency  would  have  required  an  additional
primary surplus of about 2% of GDP annually. The peg actually hid from public view the
increasing  precariousness  of the fiscal situation,  and thus made  it more  difficult to elicit
political support for an adjustment while there was still time for an orderly correction.
35  This is underscored by Rotbini  (2001).
37In  the same vein,  even if the Currency  Board had not collapsed,  households  and
firms  in non  tradable  sectors  would  have  suffered  severe  financial  stress  through the
required real  exchange rate  adjustment,  as their  capacity to repay dollar  and peso debts
would have been  eroded through the deflationary process.  This would have had a major
impact on the quality of bank portfolios, and the government would have been faced with
significant fiscal contingencies  --  though probably not as large as those that arose in fact
after the nominal devaluation.  This is further discussed in Section V below.
C.  THE ROLE OF SOCIAL  SECURITY REFORM
It has  been  noted that much of the observed  deterioration  in Argentina's  fiscal
accounts  reflects the widening deficit of the  Social Security system following its reform
in  1994. As  a  consequence  of the  reform,  workers'  Social  Security contributions  were
diverted  from the public sector towards the new private pension funds.36  Figure 4.8 plots
the  Social  Security  surplus  along  with  the  primary  and  overall  balances  of  the
consolidated  public  sector.  It  is  apparent  from  the  figure  that  from  1995  on  (and
especially  in  1997-98)  the deficit of the Social  Security accounted  for a large portion of
the overall public  sector deficit.  Further, comparison  of the public sector primary deficit
with  the  deficit of the  Social  Security  system  reveals  that from  1993  on the non-Social
Security component of the public  sector ran a primary surplus every year except  1995.
However,  not  all of the  observed  deterioration  in the  Social  Security  balance  is
attributable  to the reform.  Specifically, between  1994 and 2000-2001  the  Social Security
deficit increased  by  roughly  2 percent  of GDP.  About half of this total  (i.e.,  around  1
percent of GDP) was due to the reform.  The rest resulted from a reduction in employers'
contributions and other factors. 37  Such figure of 1 percent of GDP is small relative to the
extent  of  the  fiscal  correction  that  would  have  been  required  to  address  the  fiscal
sustainability problem identified  in the previous tables.  Thus, the fact that public finances
were  headed  for insolvency  after  1999  is not just a consequence  of the reforme-induced
increase in the Social Security deficit.
Nevertheless,  it  is  true  that  such  deficit  increase  added  to  the  conventionally-
measured  fiscal  imbalance  in  the  post-reform  years.  In  this  cgard,  it  is important  to
emphasize that the reform aimed at improving the long term structural  fiscal position of
the country  in the  first place.  Pension reform  just revealed  a hidden public  sector debt
(just like nominal devaluation  in 2002 revealed the  true volume of explicit public debt),
which had been kept out of sight by the former Pay as You Go System  (Oust  like the hard
peg did after  1997 with conventional  debt).38 The implication is that the Argentine  fiscal
situation  up to  1994 had been worse than shown by the published figures.39 In this sense,
36  See Hausmann and Velasco (2002). The economic, as opposed to accounting, merit of  this view is
disputed by Teijeiro (2001).
37 In spite of the reform, some hidden liabilities still remain in the system. See Teijeiro (2001).
38  As mentioned before, in Argentina the hidden liabilities also refer to Provincial pension systems, which
were absorbed after  1995 by the Federal  Government.
39 Strictly speaking, the same is true for any other country with unfunded pension liabilities.
38it must be  concluded  that  fiscal imbalances  (both  explicit and implicit)  were prevalent
during the whole decade.
Yet the  fact that  thle  reform  led to  a higher  measured  fiscal  deficit  still carries  a
lesson. From the economic,  as opposed to accounting,  perspective,  the higher deficit had
existed all along, and the ' lifting of the veil' just put it in the open. But the conversion of
the implicit into explicit debt did impact on two dimensions,  however. First, public sector
financing  needs  were  raised  by  the  amortization  of the  newly-recognized  debt  --  as
measured by the benefits that the public sector had to keep on paying  --  and this entailed
additional  demands  on domestic and/or foreign financial markets.  Second, perceptions of
Argentina's  fiscal position  may have been affected  as well,  to the extent that markets  did
not see fully through the veil separating  explicit from implicit government debt.
The  lesson  is that  extra care  is needed  regarding  the  consequences  for financial
markets of revealing  and  floating  hidden pension liabilities.  Even if doing  so  improves
the long term fiscal position,  it must be accompanied by further  fiscal adjustment  in the
short  term  (to  absorb  at  least  part  of the  increased  medium  term  cash  deficit)  and
appropriate long-term dormestic debt instruments. With the benefit of hindsight, the boom
years from the end of 199:5  to mid 1998 were a major lost opportunity to tackle the fiscal
imbalances revealed by the pension reform.
Figure 4.8.  The Social  Security Deficit in Perspective
(Percentage  of GDP)
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Source:  Ministero de Economia  de la Republica Argentina and  Intemational Monetary Fund.
39D.  PUBLIC DEFICITS,  EXTERNAL DEBT AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT
Finally, we explore to what extent fiscal  imbalances  contributed  to the persistent
current  account  deficits  of the  nineties.  The  latter  posed  two  risks:  they  increased
vulnerability to capital flow reversals, and also added to the overvaluation of the currency
- since,  as we  found above,  much of the peso overvaluation  can  be traced to  a steady
deterioration  of the net foreign asset position of the country.
What  were  the  contributions  of the  private  and  public  sectors  to  Argentina's
external  imbalance?  Figure  4.9  depicts  the  overall  fiscal  balance  of the  consolidated
government (exclusive  of privatization revenues)  and the private sector overall surplus -
with  the  latter  defined  as  the  difference  between  the  current  account  and  the  fiscal
balance; thus, the sum of the private and public deficits equals the current account deficit
by construction.
The  figure  reveals  a contrast between  the  private and public  sectors.  While the
public  sector  exhibited  a  deficit  every  year  since  1993,  the  private  sector  alternated
between deficit and surplus.  In particular, after  1994 the private sector exhibited a current
account deficit only in the boom years of 1997-98.  By 1999 it had moved to a position of
surplus, while the public sector continued to show large deficits.
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40Likewise,  we  can  also  examine  the  roles  of the  private  and public  sectors  in
Argentina's  foreign  debt  build-up  process.  Table  4.5  shows that  the  economy's  total
external  debt  increased  from  27.7%  to  52.5%  of GDP  between  1993  and  2001.  About
half of this  change  reflects  higher public  indebtedness,  while  fie  other half seemingly
reflects  aggressive  private  sector  borrowing  abroad.  Indeed,  private  external  debt
increased  from 5.6% of GDP to 17%  during the period.  One could view this as evidence
that  the private  sector,  as  much  as  the  public  sector,  was  behind the  accumulation  of
foreign liabilities.
However,  Table  4.5  also  shows  that  at  the  same  time  the  public  sector  was
borrowing  massively  fromn  the  private  sector  in  the  domestic  capital  market.  Indeed,
between  1993  and 2001  domestic public borrowing rose by over 20 percentage  points of
GDP.  This effectively  means  that the private  sector was  borrowing  abroad on behalf of
the government.
In  summary,  Argentina's  large  external  imbalances  and  its  deteriorating  net
foreign  asset  position  reflected  the  action  of both  the private  and  public  sectors  at
different  times. During the boom of 1997-98,  the private sector was the one showing the
larger imbalance.  However,  the public  sector failed to put its finances  on firm footing in
those  years  (especially  after  part  of the  hidden  liabilities  in  the  pension  system  had
become explicit as a consequence  of pension reform).  In turn, after 1998 the expanding
saving-investment  gap of the public sector was the main force at work behind the rising
foreign liabilities of the Argentine economy.
Table 4.5. Debt Stocks
(Percentage of GDP)
Total  Consolidated  Government  Debt  Nonfinancial  Private External
External  Total  of which:  Private and  Debt Net of Gov.
Debt  Extemal  Domestic  Financial  Bond Holdings
External  Debt
1993  27.7  213.7  22.1  6.6  5.6  -1.0
1994  29.6  30.9  23.5  7.4  6.2  -1.3
1995  39.0  34.8  26.8  7.9  12.2  4.2
1996  41.8  363.6  27.4  9.3  14.4  5.1
1997  44.8  38.1  28.2  9.9  16.6  6.7
1998  48.6  40.9  30.2  10.6  18.3  7.7
1999  52.6  47.6  33.4  14.3  19.2  5.0
2000  52.7  50.9  33.8  17.1  18.9  1.8
2001  52.5  62.2  35.4  26.8  17.0  -9.7
Source: World Developmenit  Indicators World  Bank.
41V.  THE BANKING  SYSTEM: Vulnerabilities behind a strong faqade 40
A.  STRENGTHS
Hyperinflation  and deposit  confiscation  at  the  end  of the  eighties41 wiped  out
confidence  in the peso  and  domestic  financial  intermediation.  After  Convertibility  was
enacted,  a major effort was launched to recreate  a solid financial  sector mostly based in
dollar-denominated  deposits and loans. In 1995  Tequila contagion led to a run on 18%  of
total deposits and to systemic illiquidity which, in the absence of a domestic  lender of last
resort,  required  prompt  support from  the  IFIs  to  avoid  a  collapse  of the banking  and
payments  systems.  The authorities  responded by "building"  a large liquidity buffer and
through  otler  ambitious  reforms  in  order  to  consolidate  a  highly  resilient  financial
system.  Results  were  impressive.  By  1998  Argentina  ranked  second (after  Singapore,
tied  with  Hong  Kong,  and  ahead  of Chile)  in  terms  of the  quality  of its  regulatory
environment, according to the CAMELOT rating system developed by the World Bank42
(Table 5.1).
Table 5.1.  Camelot Ratings for Banking System Regulation
Country  Total Score*
Singapore  16
Argentina  21











*Lower  numbers indicate better ranking.
Source:  World Bank. Argentina Financial Sector
Review (1998).
40 This section, and part of  the next, is based on a technical note prepared for the first version of this paper
by Augusto de la Torre and Sergio Schmukler, which later on evolved into a full-fledged paper (De la
Toffe, Levy Yeyati  and Schmukler 2003)  in which the summary analysis presented here is developed in
much more detail.
41 The so-called Bonex plan instituted in 1989.
42  The  CAMELOT index combined  separate rankings for capital requirements  (C); loan loss  provisioning
requirements  and definition of past-due  loans (A); management  (M), defined by the extent of high-quality
foreign bank presence;  liquidity requirements (L); operating environment (0) as measured by rankings with
respect to property rights, creditor rights, and enforcement;  and transparency (T),  as measured by whether
banks are rated by international risk rating agencies and by an index on corruption.  Argentina ranked  I  for
C (tied with  Singapore),  4 for A, 3 for M, 4  for L,  7 for 0, and 2 for T.  For further discussion  see  World
Bank (1998).
42The  banking systern  was  apparently in a  very solid position  not only by  1998,
before the Brazilian devaluation of January  1999, but also afterwards and through the end
of 2000,  despite  the post-1998  continued economic  contraction.  In effect,  through  the
year 2000 conventional  indicators of financial health depicted  a well-capitalized,  strongly
provisioned,  and highly  licluid banking  system,  although  it was  expenencing  losses  and
increasingly  burdened  by  bad  loans  after  1998  (Table  5.2).43  The  banking  system's
prudential buffers were sufficient to enable it to withstand sizeable liquidity and solvency
shocks-including  a flight  of more than  one-third  of the  system's  deposits  as well as  a
sudden  and  complete  deifault  in  up  to  10  percent  of  the  loan  portfolio-without
endangering  the  convertibility  system.44  The  important  presence  of  reputable  foreign
banks  in the  domestic system (they accounted  for over 70 percent of total  banking assets
in  2000)  was  broadly  perceived  to  implicitly  augment  these  liquidity  and  solvency
cushions (Table  5.3). These banks were expected to stand behind the capital and liquidity
of their affiliates in Argentina, at least in the context of bad states of the world associated
with bad  luck  (few  were  thinking  then of bad states  of the  world  caused  directly  by
confiscatory  government policy).
Table 5.2.  Selected  Banking System  Indicators
(Percentages  at end-year)
1997  1998  1999  2000
Net Worth/Assets  12.11  11.44  10.72  10.52
Capital / Risk Weighted  Assets  18.13  17.64  18.56  21.18
Non Performing  Loans/Total  Loans (a)  8.23  5.98  7.14  10.21
Provisions/Total Loans  7.70  7.10  7.82  8.65
Provisions/Non Performing  Loans (a)  108.64  140.40  122.25  77.13
Systemic Core Liquidity (b)  42.98  39.58  40.89  38.69
Return on Equity before Provisions  22.59  10.61  8.43  7.76
Retum on Equity after Provisions  7.41  -2.24  -6.71  -9.42
Return on Assets after Provisions  1.04  -0.27  -0.77  -1.01
Leverage  Ratio (not in precent)  6.11  7.26  7.74  8.33
Notes:
(a) Non performing  loans is defined as the sum of loans with problems (category 3), loans with high risk
(category 4) and non-recoverable loans (categories 5 and 6).
(b)  Defined as the ratio of international reserves of the Central Bank in foreign currency and other liquidity
requirements  held abroad, and total deposits.
Source: Central  Bank of Argentina.
43 Profits had turned negative already in 1998, and became deeply negative during 1999-2000  mainly
because of the need to constitute provisions in the face of rising bad loans.  NPLs spiked to 10.2 percent of
total loans in 2000, from 7.1 percent the year earlier,  and the increase in provisions started to lag behind
(Table  5.3).
44 Table 5.3 puts systemic core  li(quidity (disposable international reserves of the central bank plus foreign
exchange in cash or near-cash held abroad by banks) at above 35 percent of banking system deposits.
However, there was a significant variance  in the distribution of such liquidity across banks.  This may
explain why the "corralito" was imposed at the end of 2001 before deposits had fallen by 30 percent.
43Table 5.3. Consolidation and Internationalization of the Banking System
Dec.1994  Dec.  1998  Dec.  2000
Number of total banks  166  104  89
Foreign banks
Number of banks  31  39  39
Number of branches  391  1,535  1,863
Share of total assets (%)  15  55  73
Number of public banks  32  16  15
Source:  Central  Bank of Argentina.
B.  VULNERABILITIES
As  the  policy  intent was  to reinforce  the viability of convertibility,  it made no
sense  for  the  authorities  to  issue  prudential  norms  that  would  dissuade  the  use  of the
dollar in financial  contracts per se.  To be sure, the markets did not take the permanence
of the Currency  Board completely  to heart-the peso problem continued  throughout the
1990s,  as evidenced  by the always positive "currency risk" implicit in forward  contracts,
which showed  spikes during  turbulent times  (Figure  5.1).  But  the authorities  could  not
signal  the  possibility  of  a  nominal devaluation  through  prudential  norms  without
undermining  their own quest to raise  the  credibility of Convertibility  above all doubts.
The hard peg and prudential  regulation thus contributed to the high and increasing  share
of dollar  deposits  and  dollar  loans  in the  domestic  financial  system  (Figure  5.2).  The
share of dollar  deposits increased after the  Russian  crisis and the Brazilian  devaluation,
and especially after mid 2001 when expectations of devaluation  soared.
It was thus no  secret  that  a disorderly  breakdown  of the rule  of one-peso-one-
dollar  would  wreck  the  banking  system,  and  this  was  the  main  reason  why  many
Argentine  economists  and  external  analysts preferred  an exit  from the  Currency  Board
towards  full  dollarization  over  an  exit towards  a  flexible  exchange  rate  regime  and  a
monetary anchor  - and some still hold this view.
44Figure 5.1. Anticipated devaluation implied by the 30-day NDF discount --  up
to 3/15/01
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Bloomberg.  Currency premia is defined  as the difference of domestic interest rates in pesos and US dollars.
However,  with the benefit of hindsight we can now identify at least three crucial
vulnerabilities  in the  financial  sector and weaknesses  in the regulatory framnework,  even
in the hypothesis that the Currency Board was to be permanent.  The shortcomnings  relate
to:
*  the link between  debtor capacity  to pay and the required  deflationary  adjustment
to a more depreciated equilibrium real exchange  rate;
*  the growing exposure of the banking system to government default; and
*  the  insufficient  realization  that general liquidity  buffers,  even  if high,  do  not
adequately protect the payments  system from a run.
The first vulnerability had to do with credit risk-the latent non-performing loans
(NPLs)  in the context of an overvaluation of the real exchange rate (RER) relative to its
equilibrium level.  As mentioned,  it is  estimated that,  by the  year  2001,  the  Argentine
RER was  overvalued  by more than 50  percent.  Under  convertibility,  the adjustment  of
the  RER towards. equilibrium was bound to imply a protracted and painful deflation and
recession  which  would  have  certairly  eroded  the  capacity  to pay  of debtors  whose
earnings  came  from the  non tradable  sector.45 Hence, the first prudential  shortcoming
was  the  failure  to  recognize  the  special  risk  of loans  to  debtors  in  the  non tradable
sector-a credit risk that would materialize in the event of significant adverse shocks that
45 By contrast, in a country with a flexible  exchange rate (i.e.,  where a fixed parity is not part of the social
contract)  and without a liability  dollarization  problem,  the  adjustment  to a more  depreciated equilibrium
RER  would  come  through  a  nominal  depreciation,  which  would  be  associated  with  an  improvement
(through debt dilution) in the capacity to pay of debtors in the nontradable sector.
46led  to  a  deflationary  a(ljustment.46 Taking  the  one-peso-one-dollar  rule  as  a given,  it
would  have  been  advisable  for  the  authorities  to  require  tougher  loan classification
criteria (higher loan- loss provisions and/or a higher weight for the purposes of measuring
capital requirements)  in the case of loans to the non tradable sector, regardless of whether
the loans were peso or dollar-denominated. 47
The  second vulnerability  and prudential  shortcoming  also  had to  do with credit
risk, but derived from exposure  to Government  risk.  It consisted in the  failure to isolate
the solvency  of the  barking  system  from  the  solvency  of the government.  In countries
with recurrent  fiscal problems,  like Argentina,  it appears worthwhile  to endeavor to  de-
link financial  system  solvency from fiscal solvency, through the use of prudential norms.
The authorities  moved in this direction belatedly,  in 2000, when they introduced mark-to-
market requirements  for government  bond holdings and established a positive weight for
loans to the  government  for the purposes  of determining  capital requirements.  It would
have been advisable  to complement this prudential approach by not allowing government
securities  to  count as  part of the assets  eligible  to meet  liquidity requirements.  In this
manner, the stability of the banking system and the viability of convertibility would have
been  better  insulated  from  the  vagaries  of the  fiscal  process,  including  an  event  of
government  debt  default.  Direct  exposure  of banks  to  Government  risk was  not high
until  2000 - less than 20% of total assets.  However,  in 2001  the Government began to
fund  itself  using  available  liquidity  in  the  banking  system  in  response  to  increasing
external  borrowing constraints (see Figure 5.3 and Section VI).  Other components of the
financial  system,  most  notably  private  pension  funds,  had  even  higher  exposure  to
Government risk.
The  third  vulnerability  and  prudential  regulation  shortcoming  relates  to  the
insufficient realization  that general liquidity safeguards,  even if high,  do not adequately
protect the  payments  system  from  a  run.  To  be  sure,  high liquidity  requirements,  like
those in effect in Argentina during the second-half of the 1  990s, enhance the resiliency of
the  banking  system-they  cushion  the  system  vis-a-vis liquidity  shocks  and deter runs,
thereby reducing  the  scope  for multiple  equilibria.  Thanks  to its liquidity requirements,
the  Argentine  banking  system  withstood  a  prolonged  and  severe  process  of deposit
withdrawal during 2001.  At the same time, however,  the Argentine experience illustrates
that  once  a  run  is  under  way,  relaxing  liquid  reserve  requirements  can  have  adverse
signaling effects  that exacerbate  th  run on the peso (instead of spurring credit growth as
Minister Cavallo had wrongly  hoped48),  further weakening confidence.
46 In a private communication to the authors, Andrew Powell noted the use of an "interest rate factor" in
determining the required capital weight for individual loans, as an indirect way to take into account,  among
other things, such currency risks. However,  as De la Torre et al (2003) argue such factor failed to capture
the specific risk of loans to thie non tradable sector associated with eventual RER depreciations,  and  might
have even encouraged further dollarization  (as peso loans carried higher interest rates than dollar loans).
47  These suggestions apply also to fully dollarized  economies such as Ecuador. The same prescription
should apply, but only to dollar  loans  to households and firms in the non tradable sectors, in countries with
a high degree of domestic financial dollarization  but that keep flexible exchange rate systems,  such as
Uruguay,  Bolivia and Peru amnong  others.  See De la Torre et al (2003)
48  Many analysts actually cautioned about the potential negative effects of this move, and the extent of the
reduction was  a major cause of dispute between the Central Bank and the Government.
47Figure 5.3. Financial System: Exposure to Public Sector
Total Assets  164,100
(Millions of Dollars)  146,417  153,252
1576  130,929  ;1  ||l  ;1  125,069
91,534
82,5289'3  l  1.,
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
|  * Claims on the public sector  LUquid assets and claims on the private sector
Source: Central Bank of Argentina.
Moreover,  Argentina illustrates  that,  as confidence  collapses,  a general  liquidity
requirement  (available  to  all  deposits)  fails  in its  most basic  intended  function-it does
not protect  the payments  system.  The  lesson is  sobering.  In the absence  of a  credible
lender of last resort, the payments system is vulnerable  and can collapse under a run even
where  liquidity is  high,  but  still a fraction  of deposits,  and  equally available  to  finance
any deposit  withdrawal.  It thus would appear  that,  under  a currency  board and formal
dollarization,  the protection of the payments  system from bank runs may actually  require
a structure  where there is either full liquidity backing for transactions  balances - a sort of
narrow  banking  for  demand  deposits  --  or  at  least  liquidity  is  earmarked  for  those
balances  under  specified  conditions,  to  allow  the  payments  system  to  continue
functioning  (without  deposit  freezes  and payments  interruptions)  even  in  the  extreme
scenario where banks are unable to honor withdrawals of time deposits 4
49 De la Torre et al (2003)
48VI.  POLICY OPTIONS BEFORE AND  AFTER 1999
A.  THE ARGENTINE  VIA CRUCIS:  POLICY UNDER THE  DE LA RuA GOVERNMENT  AND
BEYOND.
Right from the beginning, the De la Rua administration  (which assumed power in
December  1999) was  caught in a  trap of low growth,  high and increasing  debt rollover
requirements,  and an overvalued and inflexible exchange rate. The government's  strategy
to break free  from this trap focused on reviving growth while reducing fiscal imbalances,
although the means to achieve this objective changed dramatically after April 2001,  when
Mr. Cavallo  took the post of Minister of Economy (See Annex  1).  During 2000, growth
resumption  was  sought  indirectly-trying  to regain  investor  confidence  through  fiscal
adjustment.  It  was  hoped  that  improved  confidence  would  eventually  lead  to  lower
interest  rates,  more  capital  inflows  and  growth,  making  the  debt  and  current  account
sustainable.  To be  sure.,  the  authorities  also  tried to  address  the  problem  of currency
overvaluation  directly,  through  the flexibilization  of labor markets.  But  the passage of
labor reform through Congress was linked  to a bribery  scandal that led to the resignation
of  the  Vice  President,  further  exacerbating  confidence  problems  and  weakening
governance.  In addition,  as confidence  was not restored and growth failed to pick up, the
authorities  shifted  their attention  towards  calming  fears of a possible  debt default.  The
December  2000  IMF package  (US$40  billion) was  negotiated with this  latter objective
prominently  in mind.  However,  none of these actions achieved the expected results and
hopes of reviving growth faded away.
Minister Cavallo  brought his prestige to attempt the rescue.  He  also focused  on
rekindling growth,  but this time more directly,  through heterodox  measures  (in addition
to enacting  a revenue  enhancing  financial transactions  tax).  These  included imposing  a
tax  on imports  and  subsidizing  exports  (a  fiscal  devaluation  for trade  flows),  lowering
reserve requirements,  and announcing the eventual  peg of the peso  to the dollar and the
euro (with equal weights),  once these two currencies reached parity.  With hindsight, it is
clear  that this growth-focused  strategy,  particularly  in Cavallo's  heterodox version,  was
naive.  Not  only did it fail  to  yield growth,  it  also  increased  uncertainty  about  the  two
other  components of the  trap,  namely the  debt  rollover and  the  currency  arrangement.
The trap thus tightened.
Doubts  about  convertibility  soared-the  one-peso-to-one  dollar rule had already
been broken through the back door for trade transactions  and could be easily broken  also
for  financial  transactions.  Perhaps  more  importantly,  the  government  procrastinated  in
taking  a decision  on the  debt front.  Instead of recognizing  that  debt restructuring  was
becoming a necessity  following the failed attempts  to restore  confidence  and growth,  the
government  averted debt  service  arrears by  draining the  financial  system's liquidity,  as
shown  in  Figure  5.3  above.  This  increased  the  financial  system's  exposure  to  a
government  default  and  heightened  concerns  about  a  potential  abandonment  of the
currency board --  as choices to finance the deficit through debt rapidly shrank,  the specter
of money printing loomecl larger.
49In the process, the fates of public finances,  the banking system, and the dollar peg
became  tightly  linked.  This  link  foreshadowed  the  catastrophe-a  disorderly
abandonment  of the  one-peso-one-dollar  rule  in  an economy  with  widespread  balance
sheet  vulnerabilities  (i.e.,  dollar  debts  of non-dollar  earners)  both  in the public  and the
private  sector.  As a  result, the  little  confidence  that remained was  splintered,  and the
crisis exploded as investors  and depositors  ran for the  exit,  forcing a deposit  freeze (the
"corralito"50) and a change  in government.51
B.  POLICY DILEMMAS AND OPTIONS
We  now  return  to  the  discussion  of the  harsh  policy  dilemmas  that Argentine
authorities  confronted  after  1998.  Keeping  the  hard  peg,  that  had  served  so  well  until
then,  required  a  protracted  deflationary  adjustment  to  bring  back  the  REER  to
equilibrium, given the large degree of overvaluation that had developed as a consequence
of adverse real shocks and insufficient price flexibility, as well as the deterioration of the
economy's  net  foreign asset  position.  This  deflationary  adjustment  would have  reduced
the  debt  repayment  capacity  of households  and  firms  - especially  those  in  the  non
tradable  sectors -- and, together with the long recession,  deteriorated the loan portfolio of
banks.  It would  have  also  reduced  the  debt  repayment  capacity  of the  Government,
increasingly  raising the doubts  about debt sustainability  and requiring  large expenditure
cuts,  faced  with  declining  revenues.  The  harsh  fiscal  adjustment  that  had  to  be
unavoidably  imposed  to  restore  solvency  would  also  add  to  the  recession,  further
complicating  the adjustment for households, firms, banks and the Government.  Argentine
fragile institutions -both economic and political  were to be put to a major test.
Accelerating  the  required  REER  depreciation,  in  order  to  shortcut  such  a
protracted  and  painful  deflationary  adjustment,  would  have  required  a  large  nominal
devaluation.  This,  however,  would  have  brought  immediately  to  bankruptcy  a  large
number of households  and firms in the non tradable sector with dollar denominated debts,
suddenly  deteriorating  bank  portfolios.  The  ratio  of public  debt to  GDP  would  have
ballooned  and  the  Government  might  have  found  itself  suddenly  cut  off from  credit.
Although  all these  effects  would have happened  gradually  anyhow  under  the  hard peg,
the abruptness of the balance sheet effects  might have precipitated an even larger wave of
bankruptcies  than in the alternative  scenario and, as  a consequence,  the insolvency of the
banking system and a major deposit flight.  A plain devaluation in an economy with such
50 The fact that the crisis had been widely anticipated for several months made it worse because depositors
(mostly large and informed ones) had time to withdraw around 18 percent of total deposits, leaving only
small depositors in the system.
51 It has been argued that actions taken during Cavallo's tenure were instrumental in raising doubts about
the permanence of  the Currency Board and hence perceptions  of fiscal unsustainability  (given the large
contingencies associated with a nominal devaluation), thus precipitating the final collapse. Careful
inspection of the time path of currency and country premia shows that some of those actions - the
announcement of changes in the peg, adoption of  the 'Convergence  factor', the ousting of the Central Bank
president,  the changes  in banks'  liquidity requirements - did provoke rises in currency risk, followed by
increases in country risk. However, these effects were only transitory: both currency and country premia
returned to their previous  levels after a while. Irreversible effects began to appear only by July 2001,
although it is difficult to identify any single event as the trigger.
50large  balance  sheet  misrnatches  in  both  the  public  and  private  sector  would  in  all
probability  have  led  to  an  immediate  banking  and  fiscal  crisis  -as  many  analysts,
including ourselves, predicted at the time.
What  were  the  alternatives?  The  authorities  might  have  attempted  an  earlier
forced pesification of all  domestic  contracts  before  devaluing,  in order to  limit adverse
balance  sheet effects of the devaluation to firms in non tradable sectors with foreign debts
and  to  the  Government  foreign  debt,  thus  largely  protecting  the  financial  sector
However,  forcefully breaking dollar deposit contracts would in all probability have led to
a major  deposit  flight and  would  have required  a  deposit  freeze  in order  to protect  the
payments  system.  In addition,  this  option would  have  demanded  significant  efforts  to
restore  confidence  in the  peso as  a  store  of value  and achieve  credibility  in  the  new
monetary authorities,  as well as the creation of an alternative anchor to the hard peg. The
disorderly  way  in which  this  process  was  actually  conducted,  the  increased  financial
sector exposure to Government  debt, the widespread violation of property rights through
arbitrary  asymmetric  pesification and  discriminatory  practices,  the  maintenance  of a
deposit freeze  for  a long period of time with changing rules and high uncertainty  about
the actual possibility of recovery, the almost unlimited lender-of- last-resort support to the
weakest  banks  (instead  of  confronting  the  need  for  their  resolution  through  equity
injections or liquidation),  all contributed to magnify these -to some  extent unavoidable-
adverse effects.
The  authorities  mnight  have  accepted  the  need  of  a  protracted  deflationary
adjustment  and  gone  the  opposite  route,  establishing  full  dollarization,  in  order  to
eliminate  currency risk  anid hopefully achieve  a reduction in interest rates, thus limiting
somewhat  the  duration  of the  recession  and alleviating  the required  fiscal  adjustment.
This  might  have  been  the  option  with  lower  short  term  costs  if it  had  succeeded  in
avoiding a deposit run  53  - and if it had been politically  viable.  However, debtors would
have had to cope  eventually with the adverse,  although delayed,  impact of the deflation
on  their  repayment  capacity  and,  most  importantly,  Argentina  would  have  remained
liable to similar episodes  in the future, in which large adverse  external shocks would have
required slow  and painful  deflationary  adjustments.  To  minimize these  potential  future
costs,  the  authorities  would have  had to engage  in significant  fiscal  strengthening  (not
just to protect solvency, but more broadly also to provide  some room for counter cyclical
fiscal  policies),  stricter  prudential  regulations  (harder  provisioning  or  capital
requirements  to  lend  to  households  and  firms  in  non  tradable  sectors,  a  "firewall"
between  banks and the  GCovernment,  and liquidity  earmarking  to protect the payments
system in the event of a systemic run) and considerable  flexibilization of labor and other
domestic  markets  (includLing  the  pricing  of  utilities).  Those  actions  would  have  had
salutary  effects  also  under  an eventual  foating  exchange  rate  regime,  but  were  sorely
needed under a hard peg or dollarized system.
52 This was publicly proposed by Ricardo Hausmann,  at the LACEA Conference in 2002.
53  Such an outcome, of course, was far from assured, as De la Torre et al  (2003) recognize.
51One  variant54 that could have  reaped the short term benefits  of full dollarization
while  avoiding  its  long  run  inflexibility  costs,  would  have  been  to  follow  the  full
dollarization of financial  stocks with "pesification  at the margin"  through the introduction
of a new domestic  currency,  initially circumscribed  to transactions  purposes.55 Although
this  could have  been in principle  the  best exit option at the time the  crisis  erupted,56 it
must be  recognized  that forging  the  necessary  consensus  and implementing  it smoothly
would have been no easy matter under the circumstances.
Obviously,  implementation  of any of these  alternative  courses  would have been
easier  (political  economy  considerations  aside)  and less  costly  before  solvency  doubts
had  arisen.  The  boom years  of  1996/97  were the  "best"  period  for an orderly  exit into
eitherpesification and floating or full dollarization.  Any of these courses of action should
have been accompanied  by fiscal tightening,  instead of the fiscal  expansionary  policy at
the  time,  and by considerable  institutional  strengthening,  to permit a credible monetary
policy  under  the  options  of pesification (whether  in  full  or  at  the  margin,  as  just
explained), and to reduce the deflationary consequences of future adverse external shocks
under  the  option  of  full  dollarization.  However,  this  was  precisely  the  time  when
everything  was  going  fine,  nobody  was  asking  for  a  change  and  it  might have  been
difficult to get political support for a major shift of policy and institution building. This is
by no means a new finding: we have always known that the exit from an exchange  rate
regime  should be undertaken  in good times,  precisely when nobody  sees the need for  it.
Still, it would have been convenient  at least to strengthen  the fiscal  position  - instead of
the  structural  weakening  that was  taking place,  even after  the  pension  reform  and the
recognition of other hidden liabilities had revealed the true extent of the fiscal problems  -
- as well as to adopt even stricter prudential regulations in the boom period.
As  mentioned in  the  Introduction,  these  hard choices  were just a  reflection  of a
deep structural problem.  On the one hand, the Argentine trade structure made a peg to the
dollar highly inconvenient  --  from a real economy point of view.  On the other,  the strong
preference  of Argentineans  for the dollar as a store of value since  the hyperinflation  and
confiscation experiences  in the eighties had led to a highly dollarized economy in which a
hard peg or even full dollarization seemed reasonable alternatives - from a financial point
of view.
Facing  such a dilemma,  either  the authorities  succeed in restoring  confidence  in
the peso as  a store of value  - so  that  a  floating  exchange  rate regime  and a monetary
anchor have  a  fair chance  of success  --  or they  will have to  opt for full  dollarization,
achieve  enough market flexibility  and adopt an especially strong  fiscal  stance  and strict
prudential  regulation,  allowing  the  economy  to  adjust  in  less  painful  ways  to  adverse
external  shocks  in the  future.  In either  case,  they  will have  to build stronger  and more
resilient  institutions.  After  the  recent  confiscation  of deposits  and  forced  breach  of
54 This option was first proposed by Levy Yeyati and Schmukler (2001), and its adoption was indeed
announced by president Rodriguez  Saa during its short tenure.
55 In fact, the new currency could have channeled the disorderly issuance of quasi-monies by cash-strapped
provinces  and the Federal  Government.
56 This option is discussed in detail by De la Torre et al (2003).
52contracts,  restoring  confidence  in  institutions,  in  the  peso  and  the  financial  system  -
under  whatever  exchange  rate regime  and monetary  arrangements  emerge  --  will be  a
major  challenge.  Most  likely  Argentina  will have  to  move  forward  for a  while with  a
domestic banking system basically limited to current transactions - a situation which will
give  an extra  premium to  the  development  of a sound capital  market  and to  restoring
prompt  access  to  external  credit.  Deep  crises, however,  offer  the  opportunity  for bold
changes  and we  can only  hope  that the Argentine  society grabs  the  chance to  construct
stronger institutions than those of the past and a more resilient economy, free of the major
vulnerabilities  and harsh dilemmas that characterized  the one that has just collapsed.
53Annex  1. Argentina via crucis
- President De la Ruia  assumes power in December  1999  when the country  is already  in
recession and public debt has reached high levels.
- The  government  tries  to  gain  confidence,  and  thus  restore  growth,  through  fiscal
adjustment.
- The  "impuestazo"  is  implemented  in  January  2000.  The  new  tax  scheme  includes,
among other things,  an increase in the taxation on consumer  goods, an extension of VAT
to health insurance and transportation,  and an expansion of the income tax base.
- The fiscal adjustment  does not bring  growth.  Rather,  the recession  deepens and doubts
about debt sustainability increase dramatically.
- The political  weakness  of the  De  la Rua's  administration  becomes  evident  when  vice
president Carlos Alvarez resigns in October 2000.
- In  December  2000,  Minister  Machinea  negotiates  a  US$40  billion  package  with
international  financial  institutions and domestic  financial  institutions to extend the public
debt maturity and try to ease  fears of default.  The deal implied a  much lower amount of
fresh funds, around US$12  billion.
- The  government's  bet is that once  these fears  were  eased,  growth would resume,  but
growth does not pick up and Mr. Machinea resigns in March 2001.
- The  newly  appointed  economy  minister  Lopez  Murphy  resigns  after  two weeks  in
office,  upon strong opposition  to the new fiscal  austerity package he sent to Congress on
March  16.
- Mr.  Cavallo  becomes economy  minister  once  more.  He  is empowered  by Congress
with special powers and tries different, more direct, measures to revive growth.  On April
16,  2001,  he proposes  to congress  an amendment to the convertibility  law, according  to
which  the  peso  would  be  pegged  to  a basket  consisting  of US  dollars  and  euros  with
equal weights, when the dollar-euro  rate reaches  1:1.  Congress approves the amendment
in  mid-June  2001.  This  change  aims at better aligning  the peso  more with Argentina's
trading partners.
- On  April  25,  2001,  the  president  of the  central  bank,  Mr.  Pedro  Pou,  resigns  amid
disagreements  with  Mr.  Cavallo  and  other  members  of the  government.  Mr.  Roque
Maccarone replaces  Mr. Pou.
- On July 10, 2001, the government, after being forced to pay 1,410 basis points over US
Treasuries  to place  a short-term bond, announces  a "zero  deficit" rule.  It thus becomes
obvious that  the government  cannot tap  capital markets  without the  debt exploding.  To
implement  the  zero  deficit  rule,  the  government  pushes  hard  for  an  IMF-supported
program.  But to  obtain  it,  an agreement  with  the provinces  on tax  revenue  sharing  is
needed.
- Mr.  John  Taylor,  US  Treasury  under  secretary,  declares  that  there  will  not  be  any
external help for Argentina until it can comply with its objective of a zero deficit.
- On  October  26,  2001,  negotiations  toward  an  agreement  with  the  provinces  on the
distribution of tax revenues fail (again).
- On October  28, 2001,  minister Cavallo starts negotiations  to  obtain resources  from the
IMF  and  the  US  Treasury  to  purchase  collateral  for  new  bonds  to  be  issued  in  an
exchange  for the nearly US$100 billion of local and external debt.
54- On  October  29,  2001,  Mr.  Cavallo defines  the debt exchange  operation as voluntary.
The old debt is to be exchanged  for bonds paying  7% per year and guaranteed by taxes
revenues.  However,  the  IMF  and US Treasury  ask  for compliance  with the  zero  deficit
and an  agreement  with  the  provinces  on the  tax revenue  sharing  before  any  kind  of
financial support is given. The negotiations last for more than a month.
- On  November  19,  2001,  the  IMF  announces  that  it  would  not  make  any  new
disbursements  to Argentina without being satisfied that the country has secured the  goals
previously defined.
- On  December  2,  2001,  the  government  announces  measures  restricting  deposit
withdrawals  (the corralito).  Withdrawals are  limited to 250 pesos (dollars) per week per
account.
- On December 19, 2001, Mr. Cavallo and all other ministers resigned.
- On December  20,  2001,  President  De  la  Rua resigns  and Mr.  Ramon Puerta  becomes
interim president.
- On December 23, 2001, Mr.  Rodriguez  Saa, governor of one of the provinces, becomes
the  new  interim  president.  His period  is supposed  to  last  60  days,  until  elections  are
called  on March  3,  2002.  He declares  the  suspension of external  debt payments  for at
least 60 days.
- On  December  24,  2001,  the  government  announces  that  a  new  flat  currency  (i.e.,
without foreign-currency backing)  would be created, the "argentino."
- On December 30, 2001, Mr. Rodriguez  Saa resigns and the legislative assembly chooses
Mr.  Eduardo  Duhalde  as  new  president.  He  assumes  power  on  January  2,  2002,  and
officially ends the currency board and announces the floating of the peso.
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